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INTRODUCTION
The law of forfeitures, particularly its procedure, is arcane, reflecting
ancient concepts and old admiralty practices. Starting in the 1980s, renewed
emphasis on forfeitures highlighted problems and injustices inherent in the pro-
cedure, mostly rooted in historical idiosyncrasies of forfeiture law.
Congress responded in 2000 with the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
(CAFRA), which attempted to address some of the most glaring inequities in
the administration of forfeitures. But the problems with forfeiture procedure are
not so easily patched up.
The real problem lies with the unexplored policy basis for forfeitures.
Unless and until the policy is better defined, and the procedure is tied to the
underlying policy, federal forfeitures are bound to generate anomalous and
inequitable results.
Defining and refining the policy basis for federal forfeitures requires rec-
ognition of the different types of forfeitures; distinctions must be made between
forfeitures (1) of contraband, (2) of proceeds of crime, and (3) of “facilitating
property,” which is sometimes characterized more narrowly as “instrumentali-
ties” of crime. Because the policy foundation for each of these forfeitures is
different, the appropriate procedure for each—striking a proper balance
between legitimate government interests and the rights of property owners—
must also be different.
Policies and procedures appropriate for the summary removal of
methamphetamine from circulation (a contraband forfeiture) may be grossly
inappropriate to the confiscation of a family home when one of the family
members is suspected of running an illegal gambling operation in it (a facilitat-
ing-property forfeiture). Indeed, the forfeiture of profits of either the drug or
gambling operations (a proceeds forfeiture) may require an entirely different set
of procedural considerations.
A more nuanced approach to forfeiture procedure is needed for federal
court, with procedural requirements that reflect diverse and even conflicting
policy objectives. CAFRA was a positive step toward preventing the worst
injustices, but the procedural requirements will lack coherence until they are
specifically tailored to each of the three different types of forfeitures.
Once the analysis of forfeitures is broken down this way, it becomes
apparent that the most serious problems arise in the context of facilitating-prop-
erty forfeitures. The policy justifications are by far the weakest, and the injus-
tices and inequities—including the impact on innocent owners—are the most
problematic in this category. Moreover, even when the owner is not innocent,
the forfeiture amounts to little more than a truly arbitrary fine, doing violence
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to principles of uniform and proportionate sentencing, and in some cases violat-
ing Eighth Amendment protections against excessive fines.
This Article will summarize the procedural requirements for federal forfei-
ture, including the history of the doctrine, and the weak and poorly articulated
policy justifications that have been offered over the years. After summarizing
CAFRA’s key innovations and detailing the most serious problems that persist,
the Article attempts a more complete discussion of the first principles of forfeit-
ures. Categorizing forfeitures by type, and highlighting the unique policy basis
behind each, will provide a foundation for proposing more appropriate and
effective procedures, tailored to each type of forfeiture.
In this analysis, the dubious policy objectives underlying facilitating-prop-
erty forfeitures—coupled with the serious problems that arise in that cate-
gory—become apparent, raising concerns that such forfeitures are more trouble
than they are worth. In any case, a long-overdue examination of the policy
foundation for forfeitures strongly suggests that separately defined procedures,
including burdens of proof, are warranted for forfeitures (1) of contraband, (2)
of proceeds of crime, and (3) of facilitating property (to the extent these latter
forfeitures can be justified at all). At the same time, the categorical breakdown
of forfeitures suggests a much-needed framework for assessing when forfeit-
ures violate the Eighth Amendment.
I. BASICS OF FORFEITURE PROCEDURE
At present, there are two basic procedural approaches to forfeitures in fed-
eral court: criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture. Although the impact and pur-
pose of these two procedures are virtually identical, the mechanics and
conceptual approach are quite different.
A. Criminal Forfeitures
Criminal forfeiture is an in personam action that follows a criminal con-
viction of the property owner. After a finding of guilt, the jury is asked to
consider, by special verdict, which of the property identified in the indictment
is subject to forfeiture.1 Upon a jury’s finding that the property is forfeitable,
the court may enter a preliminary order of forfeiture and allow discovery to
locate the property and a hearing to litigate any third-party claims to the
property.
Because the procedural standards for criminal conviction—including bur-
den of proof and Fourth (seizure), Fifth (due process), and Sixth (right to coun-
sel) Amendment protections—are so high, these forfeitures have not been
controversial. Moreover, the forfeiture order applies only to the property of the
convicted defendant, so as long as third-party claimants get adequate notice and
an opportunity to assert their own claim to the property, due process is easily
satisfied.2
1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1) (amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) (1972)).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Totaro, 345 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2003) (involving a criminal
forfeiture under RICO, where the defendant’s wife asserted partial ownership of the defen-
dant’s estate; the court of appeals held that she had met her burden of showing by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the estate was partially hers, and not entirely paid for by the
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Criminal forfeitures are distinct from civil forfeitures in several respects.
Because the forfeiture is in personam, only the property of the convicted defen-
dant may be forfeited, not the property of third parties used to facilitate the
crime.3 No criminal forfeiture is possible if the government cannot, or chooses
not to, prosecute, for whatever reason, including when critical evidence is inad-
missible, when the defendant cannot be found, or when the defendant is
deceased.4 Because the focus of criminal proceedings is on punishing the
defendant, it is possible to forfeit substitute assets, if the forfeitable property
cannot be located or identified, or if it is no longer in the possession of the
defendant.5 Criminal forfeitures can also be slower because the government has
no formal deadline to file an indictment after seizing the assets, and because
disposal of the property must be delayed while the rest of the criminal process,
including trial and any appeal, is pending.6
B. Civil Forfeitures
Of greater interest are the procedures for civil forfeiture, as it is far more
easily effected, and consequently far more controversial. Unlike criminal for-
feitures, civil forfeiture actions are filed in rem; the property itself is the defen-
dant in the case.7 And until statutory defenses were created in recent years, the
innocence of the owner was irrelevant.8
Indeed, in some cases civil forfeiture can be used as a substitute for prose-
cution. If the evidence is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, or if the evidence showing guilt is for some reason inadmissible, a suc-
cessful criminal prosecution will not be possible. However, the government
may be able to get “half a loaf” by pursuing a civil forfeiture of key assets of
the suspected wrongdoer.9 The death of the wrongdoer, or inability to find the
proceeds of the defendant’s RICO activity). Property may be subject to forfeiture on a wide
variety of grounds under a great many statutes calling for it. See infra Part I.B.1; see also
David Pimentel, Forfeiture Procedure in Federal Court: An Overview, 183 F.R.D. 1, app. at
18–32 (1998) (listing in Appendix A more than 160 separate federal statutes that have forfei-
ture provisions).
3 STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 1-5, at 24–25
(2007) [hereinafter CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW] (“[A] third party challenging a
criminal forfeiture on the ground that the property belonged to him, not to the defendant,
when the crime occurred does not have to be innocent. He or she must establish superior
ownership, not innocent ownership. Thus, in criminal cases, non-innocent spouses and
unindicted co-conspirators who had an interest in the property at the time the crime occurred
can recover the forfeited property in the ancillary proceeding.”).
4 Id. at 18–19.
5 Id. at 23.
6 Id. at 25–26 (In a criminal forfeiture, the property cannot be disposed of until the criminal
process is complete and third parties have had a chance to litigate their claims; in a civil
forfeiture, administrative forfeitures can be done in summary fashion if no one files a claim
to the property.).
7 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-139 A, CRIME AND FORFEITURE 1 (2007).
8 Id.
9 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 214 (1996) (statement of Stefan D. Cassella, Deputy Chief, Asset
Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, Dep’t of Justice) (Cassella
suggested this in his testimony: “Civil forfeiture is particularly important because it allows
us to reach assets that cannot be reached any other way . . . .”).
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wrongdoer, similarly will not interfere with a civil forfeiture, as long as the
property can be identified and seized. And because it is not subject to the con-
stitutional safeguards that govern criminal procedure, the process can be
straightforward and swift, especially if no one comes forward to contest the
forfeiture.10
1. What Is Forfeitable?
Justice Stevens once classified forfeitable property in three categories: (1)
“pure contraband,” (2) “proceeds of criminal activity,” and (3) “tools of the
criminal’s trade.”11 The latter category includes not only property used to com-
mit crimes, but also property used to facilitate their commission. Some of the
literature distinguishes between property integral to the commission of the
crime and the property that merely “facilitates” it,12 but the law does not make
such a distinction. Both types of property are forfeitable on the same terms, and
for purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to lump them together under the
label “facilitating property.”
These three different types of forfeitures—(1) contraband, (2) proceeds,
and (3) facilitating property—should be kept separate when discussing policy
because they all come from different sources and are implemented for different
reasons.13 For the most part, however, the procedure for all three types is the
same, and it is from this counterproductive similarity of treatment that most of
the problems with forfeiture procedure arise.
2. Jurisdiction and Venue (Civil)
Because the civil forfeiture proceeding is in rem, jurisdiction must be
established over the property (i.e., the res). This was traditionally done by seiz-
ing the property itself, so jurisdiction was solely in the district where the res
was located. In the 1990s, however, Congress expanded jurisdiction to include
the district “in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture
occurred.”14 Venue rules are permissive as well, allowing the case to proceed
(1) in the district in which the forfeiture “accrues” or where “the defendant is
found,” (2) in the district where the “property is found,” or (3) in “any district
into which the property is brought.”15
10 People have a variety of reasons for not contesting forfeitures. See infra Part III.C.2.
11 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 459 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 E.g., CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 26-2, at 779 (stating that the
phrase “property ‘used to commit’ an offense,” often called “ ‘instrumentalities’ of the
crime,” and the phrase “property used ‘to facilitate’ ” the commission of an offense relate to
two distinct concepts. “ ‘[F]acilitating property’ is a broader term referring to any property
that makes a crime easier to commit or harder to detect.”).
13 See infra Part IV.B.
14 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(1)(A) (2006).
15 28 U.S.C. § 1395 (articulating more specific venue provisions for admiralty forfeitures as
well—provisions that can be implemented under FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. E(3)(a) (amended
1998), which allows for service outside the district, bringing the rules into line with the
statutory provision at 28 U.S.C. § 1355(d)); see Pimentel, supra note 2, at 12.
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3. Administrative Forfeitures
When no one contests a civil forfeiture, that forfeiture can be carried out
administratively, without involving the court at all. Under this procedure, the
government must give owners and others with an interest in the property notice
of the forfeiture and an opportunity to contest it.16 If the claimant responds
within the narrow time deadlines and files a claim, the matter becomes a case in
federal court.17 More often, the forfeiture retains its administrative character
and is finalized without any judicial proceedings.
The government strongly favors civil administrative forfeiture procedure,
which allows it “to obtain clear title to the property that is valid against the
entire world—often within a matter of weeks—without the need to have any
contact with the judiciary, if all potential claimants are properly notified and no
one files a timely claim.”18 The government also need never bring evidence to
support an uncontested forfeiture, of course, other than the recitation of facts
that support seizing the property in the first place.19
The efficiency of the forfeiture is a two-edged sword, however; justice and
equity may be casualties of a system that too quickly and too easily extin-
guishes legitimate property rights. Because a large proportion of federal forfeit-
ures—as much as 80%20—are uncontested, and because of the staggering sums
claimed by the government in these proceedings over the past two decades, this
administrative procedure warrants closer attention.21
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FORFEITURE LAW: HOW DID WE GET HERE?
A. Origins
Although the emphasis on civil forfeitures is relatively new, the concept is
exceedingly old, dating back to the British Navigation Acts of the seventeenth
century, the common law, and even the Mosaic Law of the Old Testament.22
Early cases of the United States Supreme Court embraced the doctrine, uphold-
16 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607–08 (2006) (customs); 26 U.S.C. § 7325 (2006) (revenue).
17 CAFRA relaxed the time deadlines somewhat and eliminated the requirement to post a
cost bond. See infra Part II.B.6; DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 59–61 (2004).
18 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 4-2, at 132–33.
19 See FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. G(2)(f) (2010).
20 Stefan D. Cassella, The Case for Civil Forfeiture: Why in Rem Proceedings Are an
Essential Tool for Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, 11 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL
8, 11 (2008) [hereinafter Cassella, Civil Forfeiture], available at http://works.bepress.com/
stefan_cassella/20.
21 The problem of uncontested forfeitures, to the extent it can be considered a problem, is
discussed infra at Part III.C.2.
22 See DOYLE, supra note 7, at 2–3 (discussing common-law antecedents to modern
forfeitures).
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ing civil forfeitures23 in in rem proceedings of ships involved in violation of
customs laws, slave-trafficking laws, and war embargoes.24
Criminal forfeitures also date back to English common law, specifically
the concept of “forfeiture of estate.” Under this in personam proceeding, any-
one convicted of a felony forfeited all his lands and personal property to the
crown, in effect punishing the offender’s family for generations to come.25 For-
feiture of estate was rare in the United States; such extreme punishments were
unconstitutional in treason cases,26 and the very first Congress promptly pro-
hibited their application to other crimes.27
A more logical approach to understanding the origins of forfeiture proce-
dure requires breaking them down into categories.
1. Facilitating-Property Forfeitures—Origins
Originally, the concept was that the forfeitable property itself bears guilt;
the forfeiture of such property was an appropriate sanction for the guilty prop-
erty.28 The Biblical provision was that an ox that gores a man must be
destroyed, and its flesh not eaten.29 The innocence of the owner was immaterial
if the guilt of the thing—the guilt of the res—was clear.30
a. Admiralty and Maritime Forfeitures
This doctrine behind forfeiture of facilitating property was consistently
upheld in nineteenth-century American courts for the seizure of ships involved
23 The first Congress passed a law almost immediately, subjecting ships and cargoes that
violated customs laws to in rem forfeitures. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29,
39, 47 (repealed).
24 E.g., The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126 (1815) (involving war embargoes); Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682–83 (1974) (“[A]lmost immediately
after adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargoes involved in customs offenses were
made subject to forfeiture under federal law, as were vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign
countries, and somewhat later those used to deliver slaves to this country.”).
25 See DOYLE, supra note 7, at 2.
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except
during the Life of the Person attainted.”) (The “except during the Life” provision was appar-
ently geared to ensure that future generations were not punished for the sins of their fathers.);
see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682–83 (“Nor has forfeiture of estates as a consequence
of federal criminal conviction been permitted . . . . Forfeiture of estates resulting from a
conviction for treason has been constitutionally proscribed by Art. III, § 3, though forfeitures
of estates for the lifetime of a traitor have been sanctioned.” (internal citations omitted)).
27 See DOYLE, supra note 7, at 2. Remarkably, however, the War on Terror has resurrected
the concept in the twenty-first century. See discussion of the Patriot Act, infra Part II.C.
28 Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeit-
ures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 181
(1973); James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished at Last?, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 768, 768 (1977); DOYLE, supra note 7, at 3.
29 Exodus 21:28 (King James) (An ox that gores a person to death will be stoned “and his
flesh shall not be eaten.”).
30 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 2-6, at 39 (“By the 1990s, a long line
of cases had firmly established that property used to commit a criminal offense could be
forfeited in a civil in rem proceeding without regard to the innocence of the actual owner of
the property.”).
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in a variety of customs and maritime offenses, with no notice other than service
on the res.31 The procedure and consequences were draconian.
Vicarious liability also attached: a sailor’s single act could forfeit an entire ship even
if committed contrary to the express wishes of master or owner. The claimant bore
the burden of proving statutory compliance. In the American colonies, moreover, the
shipowner proceeded before newly established vice-admiralty courts, not a jury.32
No criminal conviction was necessary to seize the ship.33 Because “[t]he thing
is here primarily considered as the offender,”34 a forfeiture could be sustained
even if the innocence of the owner was fully established.35
The origins of facilitating-property forfeitures in customs and maritime
law are reflected in procedure even today. The rules governing civil in rem
forfeitures are found in the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Mar-
itime Claims, appended to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.36
By the nineteenth century, these forfeitures were justified as a deterrent to
negligence, providing property owners with incentives to take care to ensure
that their property was not misused.37 In the 1844 case The Brig Malek Adhel,
the Supreme Court invoked tort principles, justifying the forfeiture of an inno-
cent owner’s ship as “the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or
wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party.”38 The shift in logic did
not create new legal rules for forfeitures, but merely constituted new and more
palatable justifications for continuing the time-honored practice of forfeiting
property utilized in criminal activity.
31 Pimentel, supra note 2, at 14 (citing The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126 (1815), a case in
which the ship’s forfeiture was upheld due to the owner’s failure to timely contest it).
32 Terrance G. Reed & Joseph P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable “Interests,” and Pro-
cedural Due Process, 62 N.C. L. REV. 57, 65 (1983) (citing Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, 145
Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex. 1766)). “The Crown established these new courts to ensure preservation
of its Navigation Acts revenue from the ‘obstinate resistance of American juries.’ ” Id. at 65
n.71 (quoting C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 141 (1943)).
33 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827) (a piracy case).
34 Id. at 14 (“The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is
attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offense be malum prohibitum, or
malum in se. The same principle applies to proceedings in rem, on seizures in the Admiralty.
Many cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done attaches solely in rem, and there is no
accompanying penalty in personam. Many cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture in rem
and a personal penalty.”).
35 The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 210 (1844).
36 Pimentel, supra note 2, at 13 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of civil forfeitures are car-
ried out under one of two statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 981 and 21 U.S.C. § 881. Both statutes
specifically invoke, for process purposes, the ‘Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims,’ appended to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
37 Reed & Gill, supra note 32, at 64 (“Because a remedy for wrongful death never existed at
common law, the threat of forfeiture may have established a higher degree of care by exact-
ing a penalty for carelessness.”); CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 2-6, at
39 (“to encourage property owners to take greater care lest their property be used for an
unlawful purpose”).
38 The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233. Of course, the “suppress-the-offense”
rationale certainly overlaps with criminal law principles of deterrence.
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b. Prohibition
In the 1920s, application of forfeiture procedure was expanded beyond
maritime and customs actions and was used to seize property used to facilitate
the production and sale of illegal liquor.39 Again, such actions were brought in
rem based on the legal fiction of a guilty res.
The Supreme Court confronted the doctrine directly in 1921 in Goldsmith-
Grant.40 The case involved an automobile, sold to the buyer, in which the seller
retained a security interest.41 The buyer used the car to transport bootleg liquor
and the car was forfeited, including the security interest of the seller.42 Despite
the troubling equities of penalizing the seller, who was, after all, entirely with-
out guilt, the Court upheld the forfeiture.43
Acknowledging the “formidable” argument that forfeiture was to “pun-
ish . . . guilt” and that it was mere superstition to assume the guilt of the res, the
Court detailed countervailing considerations, including “the necessities of the
government, its revenues and policies, and . . . the necessity of making provi-
sion against their violation or evasion and the ways and means of violation or
evasion.”44 The Court also drew upon the tort theory of liability articulated in
The Brig Malek Adhel, citing Blackstone in support: “To the superstitious rea-
son to which the rule was ascribed, Blackstone adds: ‘That such misfortunes
are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore, he is properly
punishable by such forfeiture.’ ”45
Even as the Court appeared to express doubts about, and acknowledge the
possible disingenuousness of, the justifications for the rule allowing the forfei-
ture of a “guilty” res by an innocent owner, it nonetheless upheld the rule:
“[W]hether the reason for [the challenged forfeiture scheme] be artificial or
real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the
country to be now displaced.”46 This revealed, perhaps, the Court’s most com-
pelling motivation: it upheld the forfeiture not because it was persuaded that the
practice could be justified on public policy grounds, but only because the doc-
trine was so old and well-established.47
39 Jason R. Humke, Note, Passing The Buck: An Analysis of State v. Franco, 257 Neb. 15,
594 N.W.2d 633 (1999), and Nebraska’s Civil Forfeiture Law, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1299, 1303
(2005); see, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 469 (1926).
40 Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
41 Id. at 509.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 513.
44 Id. at 510.
45 Id. at 511 (quoting 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 259 (Thomas McIntyre Cooley & James De Witt Andrews eds., 4th ed. 1899)).
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 Id. The fact the practice is ancient is hardly a reason it should persist; some of the most
odious legal concepts, including slavery, are deeply rooted in history as well. But it is worth
noting that other countries that share our common law heritage presently see no role for
facilitating-property forfeitures. See Angela V.M. Leong, Assets Recovery Under the Pro-
ceeds of Crime Act 2002: The UK Experience, in CIVIL FORFEITURE OF CRIMINAL PROP-
ERTY: LEGAL MEASURES FOR TARGETING THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME 187, 188 (Simon N.M.
Young ed., 2009) (noting in the United Kingdom, forfeitures take place under the Proceeds
of Crime Act (2002), and even before that legislation, the law targeted only the proceeds of
criminal activity); see also Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 (Act No. 30/1996) (Ir.), available at
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As unsatisfying as this justification is, it apparently remains sufficient to
support the constitutionality of extinguishing property rights of an innocent
owner. In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Bennis v. Michigan, involving a
man who used a car for a liaison with a prostitute and whose car was forfeited
under the state’s public nuisance law.48 The man’s wife, who had a half interest
in the car, challenged the forfeiture. She emphasized she had nothing to do with
her husband’s illicit activity and was in some sense already a victim of his
misconduct.49 The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of the wife’s share of
the car despite the compelling equities in her favor. Reaffirming Goldsmith-
Grant, the Court stated: “We conclude today, as we concluded 75 years ago,
that the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are ‘too firmly fixed in the
punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.’”50
2. Proceeds Forfeitures—Origins: The War on Organized Crime
The proceeds of crime constitute an entirely separate category of forfeita-
ble property. The provenance of proceeds forfeitures is independent and unre-
lated, driven by entirely different policy objectives.
In the 1960s, Congress took particular interest in fighting organized crime,
culminating in Senator John L. McClellan’s “Corrupt Organizations Act,” pro-
posed in 1969.51 The Department of Justice was plainly concerned at the time
about the profitability of organized crime:
When Attorney General John N. Mitchell first testified before the Senate com-
mittee that was considering measures against organized crime, his main point was
that as long as the flow of money continued, imprisonment of the leaders of Mafia
families stimulated the promotions of new people to take the places of those
convicted.52
The Act passed in October 1970, its forfeiture provisions contained in its Title
IX, otherwise known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO).53 Congress was strongly motivated by its belief that RICO’s for-
feiture provisions would “strike at the profits of organized crime and wipe out
its hold on legitimate organizations.”54
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1996/en/act/pub/0030/sec0001.html (noting Ireland similarly
carries out its asset forfeitures under a “Proceeds of Crime Act,” which applies only to
“property obtained or received at any time . . . by or as a result of or in connection with the
commission of an offence”); see also Felix J. McKenna & Kate Egan, Ireland: A Multi-
Disciplinary Approach to Proceeds of Crime, in CIVIL FORFEITURE OF CRIMINAL PROPERTY:
LEGAL MEASURES FOR TARGETING THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME, supra, at 55 (explaining that
these forfeitures, limited to proceeds of crime, are effected under in rem proceedings).
48 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996).
49 Id. at 444.
50 Id. at 453 (quoting Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511). This case involved state forfeiture
laws, and the U.S. Supreme Court found no constitutional infirmity in the forfeiture of the
innocent owner’s interest in the car. Id.
51 LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 65–67 (1996).
Levy gives a particularly thorough treatment of this history.
52 Id. at 67.
53 Martin G. Urbina & Sara Kreitzer, The Practical Utility and Ramifications of RICO:
Thirty-Two Years After Its Implementation, 15 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 294, 296 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
54 LEVY, supra note 51, at 76.
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3. Contraband Forfeitures—Origins
Least controversial, and perhaps least interesting, are contraband forfeit-
ures. These have been around as long as the concept of contraband has been in
existence. Whenever possession of something is criminalized, the forfeitability
of that property can be assumed. In United States v. Jeffers,55 the Supreme
Court considered the status of contraband seized in an illegal search. Although
the property belonged to the petitioner, and was seized illegally, the petitioner
did not have the right to its return: “[s]ince the evidence illegally seized was
contraband the respondent was not entitled to have it returned to him.”56
We see an example in 21 U.S.C. § 881(f), which specifies that certain
controlled substances “shall be deemed contraband and summarily forfeited to
the United States.”57 Disposal of contraband does not generate revenue
because, regardless of the street value of the contraband, the government will
not return it to circulation. Indeed, the government is normally authorized to
destroy it.58
4. Expansions of Forfeiture Law: The War on Drugs
America’s “War on Drugs” had a significant impact on the development
of forfeiture law, beginning with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 197059 and the Nixon Administration’s 1973 declaration of
an “all-out, global war on the drug menace.”60 Old forfeiture doctrines, useful
in maritime actions in the nineteenth century and against bootleggers in the
early twentieth century, were revitalized when it was determined that they
might be effective in the late twentieth century, serving the compelling public
policy of suppressing drug trafficking and use in the United States.61
The government did not hold back; all three types of forfeitures were used
in the War on Drugs. The 1970 legislation provided for the forfeiture of contra-
band (all drugs illegally manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired) and
all facilitating property associated with the manufacture, transportation and
delivery of drugs (raw materials, containers, vehicles, aircraft, etc.).62 In 1978,
55 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
56 Id. at 54. The contraband could not, however, be used as evidence in the criminal pro-
ceeding because the exclusionary rule bars the use of illegally seized evidence.
57 21 U.S.C. § 881(f)(1) (2006) (enacted in 1970 as Pub. L. No. 91-513, sec. 511, 84 Stat.
1236).
58 See, e.g., id. § 881(f)(2) (“The Attorney General may direct the destruction of all con-
trolled substances in schedule I or II seized for violation of this subchapter . . . .”).
59 Part of this legislation was the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, which applied crimi-
nal forfeiture provisions similar to RICO’s against “drug kingpins.” LEVY, supra note 51, at
78–79.
60 Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 15932 (March 28, 1973), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 215 (2006), and in 87 Stat. 1091 (1973) (message from the President of the
United States transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, establishing a Drug Enforce-
ment Administration).
61 See Karis Ann-Yu Chi, Comment, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem
with Civil Asset Forfeiture in California, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1635, 1638–39 (2002); see also
Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 44 (1998) (suggesting seizure of capital and the means of
production as a method for shutting down trafficking).
62 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 3 (1999).
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that legislation was amended to provide for civil in rem forfeiture both of pro-
ceeds traceable to drug crimes and of property used or usable for facilitating
such crimes.63 In 1984, the Act was amended again to include real property that
can be classified as facilitating property for drug crimes.64 In 1986, Congress
authorized the criminal forfeiture of substitute assets if the original forfeitable
property was no longer available.65 Within a few years, one senator estimated
that drug cases accounted for 98% of forfeitures.66
By the end of the 1980s, the War on Drugs had kicked into high gear, and
the Department of Justice became increasingly active and aggressive in pursu-
ing civil forfeitures in drug cases.67 By the mid-1990s, the dramatic increase in
forfeiture filings had attracted attention, generating criticism of the concept
both from conservatives, who lamented the assault on private-property rights,68
and from liberals, who questioned overreaching by law enforcement officials.69
One example of the harshness of federal civil forfeiture as a tool in the
War on Drugs is the case of Joseph Lopes. He had retired after forty-nine years
of work on Hawaii’s sugar plantations and had purchased a modest home for
himself, his wife, and their 28-year-old mentally disturbed son, Thomas.70 At
some point, Thomas planted marijuana in the backyard of the family home and
threatened suicide whenever the parents tried to remove it. Arrested in 1987,
Thomas pled guilty to this first offense, and was sentenced to probation and
weekly psychotherapy. The family thought the episode was behind them until
four years later, when government agents arrived to inform the Lopeses that the
63 Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, sec. 301(a), § 511, 92 Stat.
3768; see LEVY, supra note 51, at 80; H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 3–4.
64 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 306, § 511(7), 98 Stat. 1837; H.R. REP.
NO. 106-192, at 4.
65 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1153, 100 Stat. 3207–13. The sub-
stitute assets provisions apply to RICO forfeitures as well, and appear to go beyond mere
proceeds and allow forfeiture of substitute assets for instrumentalities of these crimes. 18
U.S.C. § 1963(m) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (2006).
66 146 CONG. REC. 3647, 3657 (2000) (the estimate was made in the year 2000).
67 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 61, at 37 (noting that record numbers of federal
drug prosecutions between 1980 and 1992 produced record numbers of drug seizures).
Deposits into the Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund rose more than twentyfold,
from $27 million in 1985 to $556 million in 1993. H.R. REP. No. 106-192, at 4. And the
growth has continued; asset forfeiture recoveries by U.S. Attorneys rose from $285 million
in 1989 to $1.787 billion in 2010. Value of Asset Forfeiture Recoveries by U.S. Attorneys,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t4452010.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
68 See, e.g., REP. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY
SAFE FROM SEIZURE? ix–x (1995). Rep. Hyde was a leading Republican in the House and
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee at the time his book was published. See id. at x.
69 E.g., Leading House Democrat Rep. Barney Frank, then a member of the House Judiciary
Committee, stated that because a civil forfeiture is necessarily a consequence of criminal
activity, a person may have “falsely been accused of a crime and, as a consequence, had his
property seized . . . . [N]ot to appoint a lawyer [for him] . . . I think it is inconsistent
with . . . the views of this administration on social justice and fairness.” Civil Asset Forfei-
ture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
251 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary).
70 Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Government Seizures Victimize Innocent, PITTS-
BURGH PRESS, Feb. 27, 1991, available at http://www.fear.org/guilty1.html.
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government was taking their home.71 The property had been used to commit a
crime and was forfeitable under federal civil forfeiture statutes.72
Remarkably, Congress authorized law enforcement, in 1984, to keep the
assets they seize under federal forfeiture procedure.73 The Department of Jus-
tice has increased the size of the pie and shared the wealth by implementing a
program of “equitable sharing” by which state and local law enforcement can
participate.74 In other words, local law enforcement can seize assets, turn them
over to federal authorities for forfeiture purposes (taking advantage of the fed-
eral procedures which are so straightforward and favorable to law enforce-
ment), and receive a substantial cut of the proceeds.75 The assets retained by
the federal agencies are deposited in an Asset Forfeiture Fund, which these
agencies can draw upon to fund other aspects of their operations.76 Local law
enforcement gets the benefit of the favorable federal forfeiture procedure laws,
and the federal agency enjoys a cash flow from the law enforcement work done
by state and local authorities.
This practice has been criticized as creating a conflict of interest, arguably
encouraging a law enforcement strategy of targeting assets rather than stopping
crime.77 Contributing to this concern is the fact that Fourth Amendment protec-
tions do not necessarily bar the forfeiture of illegally seized assets.78 Even
71 Id. But see United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 740–42 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (holding that forfeiture of the father’s home of twenty-two years for the acts of his son
was an excessive fine barred by the Eighth Amendment); see discussion of Eighth Amend-
ment concerns infra Part IV.B.3.a.i.
72 CAFRA’s “innocent-owner” defense, discussed infra Part II.B.3, would not have helped
the Lopeses because they were fully aware of the criminal activity. However, CAFRA does
require a judicial proceeding (not a mere administrative proceeding) for the forfeiture of a
primary dwelling. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A) (2006). The legislative history also suggests
that Congress intended higher standards to apply to the forfeiture of the owner’s home: “In
one area in particular, courts have been much too liberal in finding facilitation. An especially
high standard should have to be met before we dispossess a person or family of their home.”
146 CONG. REC. 5221, 5231 (2000) (floor statement of Rep. Henry Hyde regarding H.R.
1658 (2000)). However, the final language of the statute uses the same standard for primary
residences, preponderance of the evidence, as for any other forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(c).
73 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 61, at 40; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 310, 98 Stat. 2052, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 524(c).
74 John L. Worrall, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: A Sheep in Wolf’s Cloth-
ing?, 27 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 220, 220 (2004).
75 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE
AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 3 (2009) (“Any state or local law enforcement
agency that directly participates in an investigation or prosecution that results in a federal
forfeiture may request an equitable share of the net proceeds of the forfeiture.”), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ri/projects/esguidelines.pdf. Local law enforcement can receive
up to 80% of the net assets realized, after deductions for expenses, informant fees, and valid
third-party interests. See id. at 12–15. The federal agency always gets its expenses covered,
plus 20% of the assets that remain, and a substantially larger percentage if the federal author-
ities played a role in the investigation and seizure. Id. at 12, 15.
76 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(2)(A)–(B) (2006).
77 Worrall, supra note 74, at 220; Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 61, at 40.
78 See DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES § 10.05[6]
(2012) [hereinafter SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE] (“Just as an illegal arrest of a crimi-
nal defendant is not a bar to prosecution, an illegal seizure of the res that is the defendant in a
civil forfeiture action does not bar the suit or deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear it, at
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though the evidence obtained in an illegal search will be suppressed, the forfei-
ture of property seized in that same operation will stand, as long as there is
independent cause to believe the property is forfeitable.79 The message, and the
incentives, for law enforcement are troubling.
B. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
Concern over such cavalier treatment of property rights in forfeiture cases,
both by the Department of Justice and by the courts, spurred Congress to take
up the issue, with a proposed bill and hearings in 1996 and with renewed activ-
ity in 1999, ultimately leading to the passage of CAFRA in 2000. CAFRA,
which adjusted burdens of proof and bolstered the rights of property owners,
including innocent owners, in federal civil forfeitures was “the first significant
reform of civil forfeiture procedure since the dawn of the Republic.”80
CAFRA may have been “significant,” but it was not comprehensive.81
Indeed, the whole bill smacks of patchwork, adjusting standards and overturn-
ing the doctrines responsible for the worst injustices, but neither reexamining
the foundations of forfeiture law nor establishing a sound policy rationale for
forfeiture procedure overall.82 It was a compromise bill with terms negotiated
and tweaked until it could muster unanimous approval from the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, a necessary precondition to getting it passed in an election
year.83 As one commentator put it:
The Act is not comprehensive. It is not a revision of forfeiture law based on first
principles. It is, rather, a series of practical “fixes” of specific problems that have
arisen that either the reformers or the government wanted to fix and with which the
other side could agree, or at least tolerate.84
Even post-CAFRA, forfeitures continue to attract criticism.85 Perhaps the
problem is that the “first principles” still await a thorough examination.
least in federal court. . . . [This rule] is now codified in Rule G(8)(a) (‘Suppression does not
affect forfeiture of the property based on independently derived evidence.’). While evidence
obtained as the result of an illegal search or seizure may be suppressed, the government can
still attempt to forfeit the property on the basis of evidence that is not tainted by the
illegality.”).
79 Id.
80 David B. Smith, An Insider’s View of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000,
CHAMPION, June 24, 2000, at 28. [hereinafter Smith, An Insider’s View] (“Talk about reform
being ‘overdue’ was an understatement.”).
81 Id. at 28–29.
82 Id. at 28. The legislative history provides some policy background with respect to civil
forfeiture legislation proposed in the previous Congress. See, e.g., Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 105,
115, 117 (1997) (statement of Stefan Cassella, Deputy Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money
Laundering Section, Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice), but this discussion did not make it
into the final legislation.
83 See Smith, An Insider’s View, supra note 80, at 28.
84 Id. at 29.
85 See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, Federal Asset Seizures Rise, Netting Inno-
cent with Guilty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2011, at A1; Chip Mellor, Civil Forfeiture Laws and
the Continued Assault on Private Property, FORBES (June 8, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/
2011/06/08/property-civil-forfeiture.html (“Civil forfeiture laws represent one of the most
serious assaults on private property rights in the nation today. Under civil forfeiture, police
and prosecutors can seize your car or other property, sell it and use the proceeds to fund
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Most of the criticisms of federal forfeiture have focused on the civil side;
indeed, the reform legislation in 2000 was directed almost exclusively at civil
forfeitures.86 The procedures before CAFRA were exceedingly generous to the
government, requiring only a showing of probable cause, after which the bur-
den of proof shifted to the property owner to establish that the property was not
subject to forfeiture.87 But CAFRA made important changes to this require-
ment and to others deemed too hostile to property owners, particularly innocent
ones. Key innovations from CAFRA are summarized below.
1. Burdens of Proof
The House Committee on the Judiciary noted that the probable-cause stan-
dard was too low, particularly since the government was not required to “pro-
duce any admissible evidence and may deprive citizens of property based on
the rankest of hearsay and the flimsiest evidence.”88 The Committee concluded
that “[t]his result clearly does not reflect the value of private property in our
society, and makes the risk of an erroneous deprivation intolerable.”89
The House version of CAFRA would have imposed on the government the
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for a civil forfeiture,90 but the Justice
Department and some senators opposed adoption of that standard.91 Those
opponents argued the standard should be the same as in all other civil cases—
preponderance of the evidence—and the version of CAFRA that passed the
Senate, and that President Clinton ultimately signed into law, adopted that less
demanding standard.92 Nonetheless, the burden of proof now rests with the
government and not with the property owner.
If the forfeiture goes uncontested, however, CAFRA still allows forfeiture
without an evidentiary showing.93 The impact of the new burden of proof
agency budgets—all without so much as charging you with a crime.”). See also infra Part
III.
86 There is a provision in CAFRA that expands the availability of criminal forfeitures, but
that was motivated entirely by a desire to limit the use of civil forfeitures, and to use criminal
forfeitures instead, wherever possible. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-185, sec. 16, 114 Stat. 202 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (2006)); see infra
Part II.B.8.a.
87 Pre-CAFRA requirements are more thoroughly explained in my 1998 overview of federal
forfeiture procedure. Pimentel, supra note 2, at 5–9 (giving a thorough explanation of pre-
CAFRA requirements in an overview of federal forfeiture procedure).
88 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 12 (1999) (quoting United States v. $12,390, 956 F.2d 801,
811 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., dissenting)).
89 Id.
90 146 CONG. REC. H2049, H2049–52 (2000) (Floor Statement of Henry Hyde regarding
H.R. 1658). Rep. Hyde cautioned that “Congress remains extremely dubious as to the proba-
tive value of certain types of evidence in meeting this standard,” giving examples from
cases: carrying large quantities of cash, purchasing airline tickets with cash, dog-alerts on
cash (absent evidence how or when the cash became tainted with drugs), and matching a
drug courier profile. Id. at H2049–50.
91 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 34.
92 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2006).
93 See the discussion of the Willie Jones case, infra Part III.B, where $9,000 in cash was
forfeited based on the fact that the government thought it was suspicious Mr. Jones was
traveling with so much cash and bought his plane ticket with cash, coupled with a sniffing
dog’s “alert” on the cash itself as containing some residue of illegal drugs. Although Mr.
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therefore is limited to the relatively small portion of forfeitures that are chal-
lenged in court.94
a. Claimant’s Burdens—Affirmative Defenses
The property owner is still required to prove affirmative defenses, most
notably the “innocent-owner” defense introduced by CAFRA.95 For these
defenses, the owner must meet the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.96
b. Claimant’s Burdens—The USA PATRIOT Act’s Exception to
CAFRA
Just one year after the passage of CAFRA, the USA PATRIOT Act (the
“Patriot Act”) created an exception to this new burden of proof, reverting to the
much-criticized pre-CAFRA standard, even for a contested forfeiture.97 The
provisions of the Patriot Act, as the federal law is more commonly known, are
discussed in more detail below.98
2. Appointment of Counsel
Under CAFRA, indigent claimants in a civil forfeiture proceeding are enti-
tled to counsel at public expense if (1) they are already represented by court-
appointed counsel in related criminal proceedings or (2) the property at issue is
the person’s primary residence.99 The House Report noted the “punitive
nature” of civil forfeiture as a justification for the provision.100
3. Uniform “Innocent-Owner” Defense
CAFRA formally created a uniform and comprehensive affirmative
defense for innocent owners. The House Committee believed it was “required
by fundamental fairness.”101 A variety of statutes and cases had recognized
Jones opted to contest this forfeiture, his failure to do so would have resulted in the seizure
of his cash without more than probable cause. In Rep. Hyde’s earlier forfeiture reform bill,
very similar to CAFRA, introduced in the previous Congress but never passed, the House
Report specifically stated that uncontested forfeitures would still be allowed to go forward
on nothing more than probable cause. H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 28 (1997). Rule
G(2)(f) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims requires little
more, only a recitation of “sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the
government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. G(2)(f).
94 Only 20% of civil forfeitures are contested. See Cassella, Civil Forfeiture, supra note 20,
at 5.
95 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing innocent owner defense).
96 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
97 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 316(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
98 See infra Part II.C.
99 18 U.S.C. §§ 983(b)(1)(A) & (2)(A).
100 H.R. REP. 106-192, at 14 (1999); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 2, at 29 (1997).
(“This Committee believes that given the punitive, quasi-criminal nature of civil forfeiture
proceedings, legal representation should be provided for those who are indigent in appropri-
ate circumstance.”). If, as suggested here, the purposes of forfeiture are punitive, then deter-
minate sentencing principles may play a role in assessing the fairness of such punishments.
See infra Part IV.B.3.a.
101 H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, at 31.
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“innocent-owner” defenses in certain circumstances,102 but an earlier Commit-
tee Report noted those defenses were not uniform and had been inconsistently
interpreted by the federal courts.103
The definition of an “innocent owner” includes “one who, at the time he
acquired the interest in the property, was a bona fide purchaser or seller for
value and [was] reasonably without cause to believe that the property was sub-
ject to forfeiture.”104 The provision does not, for the most part, protect innocent
donees.105 Otherwise, criminals could shield their property from forfeiture
through transfers to relatives.106
4. Hardship Provision
Recognizing that hardship may result from the government’s seizure of
property pending resolution of disputed issues, CAFRA also created a provi-
sion to protect property owners in such circumstances. Operating much like
preliminary injunctions, the statute calls for a balancing of hardships, taking
into account “the risk that the property will be destroyed, damaged, lost, con-
cealed, or transferred if it is returned to the claimant during the pendency of the
proceeding[s].”107 The upshot is that an owner who faces “substantial hard-
ship” in being deprived of the property may be able to keep the property pend-
ing a final determination on forfeiture.108
5. Compensation, with Interest, for Damage to Property While in the
Government’s Possession
CAFRA also amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to permit tort claims
against the government to recover the value of property damaged or destroyed
102 Although the CAFRA innocent owner defense is comprehensive, applying to all federal
civil forfeitures, it created a narrower defense for innocent owners than was already available
under some other statutes. See Smith, An Insider’s View, supra note 80, at 29; see also infra
pp. 26–27 and note 171.
103 H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, at 31.
104 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 16.
105 There is a separate provision which covers innocent owners who acquired their interest
through inheritance, divorce, etc. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(B)(i)–(iv). For such claimants to
prevail, however, all of the following must be true: (1) the property must be the primary
residence of the claimant; (2) depriving the claimant of the property would deprive the
claimant (and his/her dependents) of reasonable shelter; (3) the property must not be tracea-
ble to the proceeds of any criminal offense; (4) the claimant must have acquired interest in
the property through marriage, divorce, legal separation, inheritance, or probate. Id.
106 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 16 (citing United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S.
111, 139 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[C]riminals would then be allowed to shield
their property from forfeiture through transfers to relatives.”)). Innocent owner status may be
accorded, however, to those who acquire property interests through probate or inheritance, or
through marriage dissolution proceedings, as long as the recipient did not have cause to
believe the property was subject to forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A)–(B) (2006). The risk
of fraud here is slight, the Committee concluded, and the injustice is great if the heir is called
upon to defend the forfeiture later because it will be difficult to present evidence as to what
was in the mind of the deceased at the time. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 16.
107 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(1)(D) (2006).
108 Of course, this provision does not apply to contraband. Id. § 983(f)(8)(A). Nor does it
apply to property that is “suited for use in illegal activities; or is likely to be used to commit
additional criminal acts if returned to the claimant.” Id. § 983(f)(8)(C)–(D).
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while in the possession of any law enforcement officer if the property was
seized for the purposes of civil forfeiture.109 Of course, such claims cannot
stand if the forfeiture is ultimately upheld.110
The House Report included the testimony of Billy Munnerlyn, the owner
and operator of an air charter service, whose plane was seized in 1989 after he
unwittingly transported a client who was carrying drug money.111 Mr. Munner-
lyn spent $85,000 on legal fees, selling his three other planes to fund the litiga-
tion to get his plane back.112 When the plane was finally returned to him, Mr.
Munnerlyn found that the government had done $100,000 worth of damage to
it, presumably in their search for drugs or other evidence. The government’s
sovereign immunity barred any claim for the damage to the plane, so Mr. Mun-
nerlyn had little choice but to declare personal bankruptcy and give up his
business.113 No doubt this story motivated Congress to include the provisions
for government liability for damage to seized property.
Prior to CAFRA, the government paid no interest for the time it held the
property before being ordered to return it to a prevailing owner. The House
Committee on the Judiciary had earlier expressed concern that this was “mani-
festly unfair.”114 Accordingly, CAFRA includes provisions entitling a success-
ful claimant to interest on the assets seized for the time the government retained
them, and if the court finds no reasonable cause for the seizure, the claimant
can get costs and attorney fees as well.115
6. Elimination of the Cost Bond
Prior to the passage of CAFRA, a claimant was required to post a cost
bond to “defray the government’s cost of storing the property and to cover
government litigation costs.”116 The bond requirement also was intended to
deter frivolous claims.117
The House Committee on the Judiciary concluded that the cost bond
deprived indigent claimants access to the courts and was likely unconstitu-
tional.118 Even for non-indigent claimants, the Committee determined that the
cost bond added an unnecessary deterrent to contesting forfeitures.119 At least
one Senator agreed, suggesting that the cost bond “offend[ed] the fundamental
principle of equal and open access to the courts.”120 Instead of a bond, CAFRA
109 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, sec. 3(a), 114 Stat. 202
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (2000)). This provision of CAFRA was clearly
intended to address situations like the one cited.
110 Id.
111 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 8.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 9. Apparently, Mr. Munnerlyn ended up driving a truck for a living after the
government’s failed attempt to forfeit his plane destroyed his business and his credit.
114 Id. at 19.
115 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, sec. 4(b), 114 Stat. 202
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2465 (2000)).
116 Louis S. Rulli, The Long Term Impact of CAFRA: Expanding Access to Counsel and
Encouraging Greater Use of Criminal Forfeiture, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 90 (2001).
117 146 CONG. REC. S1761 (2000).
118 H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 6, at 34 (1997).
119 Id.
120 146 CONG. REC. S1761 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
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discourages meritless claims by imposing a civil fine if the court finds a claim-
ant’s challenge to be frivolous.121
7. Notice and Adequate Time to Contest Forfeiture
CAFRA imposed requirements for the government to move more expedi-
tiously, imposing a sixty-day time limit after the seizure to send notice to
potential claimants.122 Prior to CAFRA, a potential challenger to forfeiture
often had an “exceedingly short” time to file a claim after such notice, as little
as ten days, although these time frames varied under the sundry statutes that
provided for forfeiture.123 CAFRA remedied that by implementing a uniform
and slightly more generous time period of thirty days to file a claim.124
8. Additional Reforms
a. Expanded Availability of Criminal Forfeiture
CAFRA encourages the use of criminal forfeiture by including a provision
that amends 18 U.S.C. § 2461 to authorize use of criminal forfeiture any time
civil forfeiture is authorized.125 This change reflects a congressional preference
for criminal forfeitures, which enjoy far stronger due process protections and
are therefore far less likely to infringe on the legitimate property rights of citi-
zens, innocent or not.126
b. Requiring a “Substantial Connection” Between the Property
and the Offense
CAFRA clarified the nexus that must be established between the offense
prompting the forfeiture and the property forfeited. Case law had been inconsis-
tent on this point,127 and the legislation resolved the dispute in favor of the
more demanding standard of a substantial connection.128 Under CAFRA’s
121 18 U.S.C. § 983(h)(1) (2006).
122 Id. § 938(a)(1)(A)(i); Smith, An Insider’s View, supra note 80, at 29 (“The government
is no longer given the power to delay the commencement of proceedings as long is [sic] it
likes after seizing someone’s property.”).
123 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 19 (1999) (quoting DAVID SMITH, PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES, § 9.03[1], at 9-45 (1998)); Pimentel, supra note 2, at 15
(explaining how in 1998 the Supplemental Rules were amended for non-admiralty forfeit-
ures to allow twenty days to file a claim, instead of the previous ten days, which still applied
to admiralty forfeitures, but cautioning: “Even as amended, however, the time to respond is
short. Because the property rights of innocent third parties are at stake, the adequacy of
notice and time to respond deserve particular attention.”).
124 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) (2006).
125 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (2006).
126 See discussion infra note 202 regarding the congressional preference for criminal over
civil forfeitures.
127 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 61, at 45–46 n.44 (1998) (discussing the conflict-
ing case law on this issue).
128 As Senator Henry Hyde explained in his statement on the issue:
H.R. 1658 provides that the substantial connection test should be used whenever facilitating
property is subject to civil forfeiture under the U.S. Code. And the test is intended to mean
something, it is intended to require that facilitating property have a connection to the underlying
crime significantly greater than just “incidental or fortuitous.”
. . .
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standard, the government must prove that facilitating property’s connection to
the criminal offense was “substantial” and not merely incidental or
fortuitous.129
c. Forfeitability of Proceeds of Most Crimes
Originally, forfeiture of the proceeds of crime was available only for vio-
lations of RICO and for violations of some money laundering statutes.130 By
1978, proceeds forfeitures were available for a number of drug crimes.131 By
the 1990s, civil forfeiture authority had been extended to cover most federal
crimes.132 Then, in 2000, CAFRA expanded section 981(a)(1)(C) to include the
proceeds of more than two hundred different state and federal crimes as defined
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) or a conspiracy to commit any one of those
offenses.133
C. The Patriot Act and the War on Terror: Two Steps Forward, One Step
Back
Eighteen months after CAFRA was signed into law by President Clinton,
President Bush signed into law the Patriot Act.134 It is not surprising that for-
feitures were implicated in this opening salvo in the War on Terror, as they had
been for Prohibition, the War on Organized Crime, and the War on Drugs.
Under H.R. 1658’s substantial connection test, in order for an entire bank account com-
posed of both tainted and untainted funds to be forfeitable, a primary purpose of its establishment
or maintenance must be to disguise a money laundering scheme. This rule should also apply
when the government seeks to forfeit an entire business because tainted funds were laundered in
a firm bank account. For the business to be forfeitable, a primary purpose for the establishment
or maintenance of the entire business must be to disguise a money laundering scheme.
146 CONG. REC. 5231–32 (2000) (statement of Sen. Henry Hyde).
129 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3) (2006); see also CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra
note 3, § 26-1, at 776.
130 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 938 (1970)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963) (Enacting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO)); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982, 1963 (current statutes addressing civil
forfeitures (enacted in 1986), criminal forfeitures (enacted in 1986), and other criminal pen-
alties (enacted in 1970) respectively).
131 See supra text accompanying note 63.
132 Stefan D. Cassella, An Overview of Asset Forfeiture in the United States, in CIVIL FOR-
FEITURE OF CRIMINAL PROPERTY: LEGAL MEASURES FOR TARGETING THE PROCEEDS OF
CRIME, supra note 47, at 23, 28.
133 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C); CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 1-3(a), at
5; Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law, 55 U.S.A.
BULL. 59, 62 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/
usab5506.pdf; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (incorporating crimes defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1), a laundry list of offenses against foreign nations (including drug crimes, violent
crimes, fraud by or against a foreign bank, bribery of a public official, or embezzlement of
public funds)).
134 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in
scattered titles and sections of the United States Code), signed into law on October 26, 2001,
eighteen months and one day after April 25, 2000, when President Clinton signed CAFRA.
The unwieldy title of the act, apparently manipulated to produce an appealing acronym, is
the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.”
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1. Burden of Proof
As already noted, the Patriot Act brought back, for terrorism cases at least,
the pre-CAFRA standards of proof for civil forfeitures:
Under section 316 of the Patriot Act, if the case goes to trial under § 981(a)(1)(G),
and the property involves the assets of “suspected international terrorists,” the normal
burden of proof is reversed: once the [g]overnment makes its initial showing of prob-
able cause, the claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that his property is not subject to confiscation.135
Thus, some of the very problems that Congress tried to fix with CAFRA have
been reintroduced for cases of suspected terrorism. This is important when con-
sidering the policies underlying forfeitures. Forfeiture procedure inevitably
involves striking a balance between citizens’ property rights and the govern-
ment’s interest in combatting crime. Any time the government’s interest is ele-
vated to the status of a “War on” something, it can be expected that the new
policy priority will result in re-striking that balance in favor of the government
and to the detriment of the property rights of its citizens.
2. Forfeiture of Estate
The Patriot Act also revived the concept of forfeiture of estate by provid-
ing for forfeiture of all assets without any proof of any nexus between the
assets and the terrorism offense.136 Already unconstitutional for treason,137 for-
feiture of estate had been barred by statute for other crimes since 1790.138 It is
truly a remarkable development to see a long discredited doctrine, a doctrine
that had been relegated to the dustbin of history for more than 210 years,
revived and re-enacted. As codified in Title 18, the Patriot Act permits the
forfeiture of “[a]ll assets, foreign or domestic—of any individual . . . engaged
in planning or perpetrating any . . . Federal crime of terrorism.”139 It appears
that this provision has only rarely, if ever, been invoked,140 possibly because
the Department of Justice is reluctant to litigate its constitutionality. Certainly if
the Constitution explicitly forbids forfeiture of estate for treason, there is at
least a question as to the constitutionality of forfeiture of estate for acts of (or in
support of) terrorism against the state.
135 Stefan D. Cassella, Forfeiture of Terrorist Assets Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,
34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 7, 9–10 (2002).
136 Id. at 7–8 (“[O]nce the [g]overnment establishes that a person, entity, or organization is
engaged in terrorism against the United States, . . . the [g]overnment can seize and ultimately
mandate forfeiture of all assets, foreign or domestic, of the terrorist entity, whether those
assets are connected to terrorism or not.”) Id. at 8.
137 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
138 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (“[N]o conviction or judgment for any of
the offences aforesaid, shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate.”).
139 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i) (2006); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (2006).
140 DOYLE, supra note 7, at 3–4 n.16 (“At least to date [May 9, 2007], this authority has
rarely, if ever, been used.”).
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III. CONTINUING CRITICISM AND CONCERNS
Notwithstanding the reforms that came with CAFRA, the problems persist
and the criticisms continue.141 Much of the criticism comes in the form of a
parade of horribles, detailing injustices of individual cases.142 The cases of
Mrs. Bennis and the Lopes family remain potent examples; CAFRA probably
would not have helped either one of them.143 Anecdotes like these aside, the
criticism tends to fall into a few general categories, summarized below.
A. The Failure to Justify Forfeitures in Terms of Public Policy
As already suggested, the articulated policy justifications for forfeiture
procedure are unsatisfying, with even the Supreme Court upholding them sim-
ply because they have been around so long.144 Other justifications that have
been proffered, particularly for facilitating-property forfeitures,145 appear to be
ad hoc afterthoughts, attempts to justify existing practice. Thus, we have a
practice and procedure in search of a policy, rather than a practice and proce-
dure that is driven by and tailored to serve compelling policy objectives.
So are there policy objectives compelling enough to warrant this problem-
atic procedure? If so, what are they? Closer analysis of the different types of
forfeitures yields very different answers for each, both in terms of what policy
drives them and whether it is sufficient to justify them.
Today, forfeitures are justified on a variety of policy bases. Courts occa-
sionally cite various purposes to be served,146 but the closest thing to a compre-
hensive statement comes from Stefan Cassella of the Asset Forfeiture and
Money Laundering Section of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Divi-
sion. In testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1997, he
said that forfeiture exists to (1) seize contraband, (2) take the property that
facilitates crime out of circulation, (3) seize the proceeds of crime, (4) return
the proceeds of crime to victims, (5) deter crime, and (6) punish criminals.147
141 See Mellor, supra note 85.
142 See, e.g., Eric Moores, Note, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 ARIZ.
L. REV. 777, 779 (2009); Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility—the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture Sys-
tem, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2002); David Benjamin Ross, Note, Civil Forfeiture: A
Fiction That Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 259, 259 (2000).
143 Mrs. Bennis lost her car under the laws of the state of Michigan, so CAFRA’s innocent
owner defense would not have been available to her. The Lopeses were aware of the mari-
juana patch their son had planted in their backyard and therefore could not have asserted
CAFRA’s innocent owner defense in any case.
144 See supra Part II.A.1.
145 See supra Part II.A.1.a.
146 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974), for example,
the Supreme Court characterized the policy in terms of “punitive and deterrent purposes.”
147 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 112 (1997) (statement of Stefan D. Cassella, Deputy Chief, Asset
Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice); this lan-
guage is also reflected in H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 5 (1999).
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The six purposes articulated here are remarkably unsatisfying as justifica-
tions for the forfeitures.148 The first three are mutually exclusive; these are
three different types of forfeitures and no forfeiture accomplishes more than
one of them. Moreover, these reasons largely beg the question: the public pol-
icy purpose behind proceeds forfeitures cannot be merely to “seize the pro-
ceeds.” This circular justification, reduced to a tautology, betrays the thinness
of the underlying policy. More substantive policy is needed to justify the proce-
dure with respect to each of the three types of forfeitures. A more careful exam-
ination of each is set forth below in Section IV.B.
The fourth purpose, returning the proceeds of crime to victims, is a lauda-
tory objective,149 but perhaps a misleading one; historically, very little of the
assets seized in federal forfeitures was ever returned to victims.150 The over-
whelming majority of forfeited property is kept by and shared among law
enforcement agencies to fund law enforcement activities.151
The final two purposes, to deter crime and punish criminals, are the most
compelling reasons and may underlie all the others. The Supreme Court lent
support to this in Calero-Toledo, characterizing the policy to be served in terms
of “punitive and deterrent purposes.”152 But these are largely duplicative of the
purposes of criminal law, raising questions as to whether and why it is neces-
sary to pursue criminal law objectives with forfeitures. The likely answers—for
example, that it allows the government to punish people without proving their
guilt—may prove to be a better argument against the forfeitures than in favor
of them.
148 Mr. Cassella was not attempting to justify forfeitures in this statement as much as
describe their functions. The concern here is that there has been so little discussion of the
actual justification for forfeitures.
149 It was a justification for forfeiture cited by the Supreme Court back in 1844, when the
forfeiture of a ship was upheld as a “means of . . . insuring an indemnity to the injured
party.” The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).
150 In 2010, the Department of Justice took in almost $1.8 billion in asset forfeitures, and
returned $237 million (just over 13%) to victims. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR
U.S. ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 31 (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2010/10statrpt.pdf. This
13% reflects a new emphasis on victim restitution in the last four or five years. See generally
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM, NATIONAL ASSET FORFEITURE STRATE-
GIC PLAN 2008–12, at 3, 11, 42 (2008) (highlighting victim restitution as a key element of
the plan).
151 See, e.g., Value of Asset Forfeiture Recoveries by U.S. Attorneys, supra note 67 (“The
funds are used for purposes such as equipment, training, investigative expenses, purchase of
evidence, and drug and gang awareness programs.”). Cassella, in his testimony before Con-
gress, identified that as the primary use of seized assets:
[T]hat money is used to support the operation of law enforcement itself. . . .
There is poetic justice in this, Mr. Chairman. Forfeiture not only lets us take the profit out of
crime; it provides support for the law enforcement agencies who catch the criminals and put
them in jail.
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 104th Cong. 214 (1996) (statement of Stefan D. Cassella, Deputy Chief, Asset Forfei-
ture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice).
152 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974).
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B. The Government’s Burden of Proof Is Still Too Low
CAFRA attempted to address the problem of burdens of proof and suc-
ceeded in shifting the burden to the government to prove that the property is
forfeitable. But, the government need only establish such forfeitability by a
preponderance of the evidence; the House’s efforts to set the standard at clear
and convincing evidence failed in the Senate.153 Although an innocent owner
can assert her innocence under CAFRA, she still bears the burden of proving
her innocence.154 These factors have prompted critics to argue that the alloca-
tion of burdens still tips the scales too heavily in favor of the government.155
The problem is not just the language of the statute, but the interpretation the
courts have chosen to give it. “David B. Smith, author of the [treatise] Prosecu-
tion and Defense of Forfeiture Cases, says the courts have been steadily miti-
gating the 2000 bill’s impact, both by narrowly interpreting the protections it
grants defendants and by being overly deferential to prosecutors when deter-
mining if they’ve met the new evidentiary standard.”156
Illustrative is one of the horror stories told to the House Judiciary Commit-
tee and included in its report on CAFRA. In 1991, Willie Jones, who operated a
landscaping business in Tennessee, attempted to fly to Houston to purchase
nursery stock, carrying $9,000 in cash with him.157 He testified that he knew it
would be easier to make his purchase with cash, especially since he was from
out of town. As he put it, “[T]he nursery business is kind of like the cattle
business. You can always do better with cash money.”158 After buying his
ticket with cash, Mr. Jones was approached by officers who accused him of
dealing drugs.159 They did a background check on him, and found him to be
“clean,” but drug-sniffing dogs “hit” on the money, so the officers let Mr. Jones
go but they kept his money.160 The officers refused to count the money or issue
a receipt for it.161 In the litigation that followed, Mr. Jones, who is African
American, asserted his belief that the seizure was racially motivated, a product
of law enforcement’s racial profiling of drug dealers.162
Congress attempted to address this problem with its heightened standard
of proof, but nothing in CAFRA itself would prevent this type of seizure from
153 146 CONG. REC. H2049 (2000) (Congressional Budget Office cost estimate entered into
the record by Sen. Henry Hyde) (“H.R. 1658, as amended by the Senate, reduced the stan-
dard of proof the government has to meet in civil asset forfeiture cases from clear and con-
vincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence.”).
154 See infra Part III.C.1.
155 See, e.g., Moores, supra note 142, at 797–98 (“Congress should increase the govern-
ment’s burden of proof from ‘preponderance of the evidence’ to ‘clear and convincing evi-
dence,’ which would make it more difficult for the government to prevail with flimsy
evidence.”); Johnson, supra note 142, at 1075–76 (arguing that the changes in the burden of
proof under CAFRA “do not go far enough,” and that “a higher standard of proof is
appropriate.”).
156 Radley Balko, Forfeiture Folly: Cover Your Assets, REASON.COM (Apr. 2008), http://
reason.com/archives/2008/03/07/forfeiture-folly.
157 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 6 (1999).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 6–7.
161 Id. at 7.
162 Id.
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happening again. Law enforcement can still seize money based on probable
cause, and although it is doubtful that carrying large amounts of cash “while
black” constitutes probable cause, the dogs’ “hit” on the money may be enough
to satisfy the federal courts of at least nine U.S. states and two U.S. territo-
ries.163 In 2001, the Ninth Circuit upheld a forfeiture on similar facts, relying
heavily on the dog alert despite prior rulings by other circuits seriously
impugning the probative value of dog alerts on currency.164 Since 2001, the
impugnation has continued in other circuits and in a Supreme Court justice’s
dissent.165
Because probable cause may be sufficient for the initial seizure, CAFRA’s
new burden of proof for the government is relevant only if the forfeiture is
contested.166 Unless it is contested, the forfeiture is completed administratively,
based on nothing more than the original cause to seize the property.167 Only if
the claimant contests the forfeiture—and hiring counsel to help here may be
difficult since the government has seized his property—is the government actu-
ally called upon to prove forfeitability by a preponderance of the evidence. And
as for Mr. Jones’s innocence, as explained below, he bears the burden of prov-
ing that.
C. Due Process for Owners, Especially Third-Party Owners
1. Inadequacy of the Innocent-Owner Defense
Although some forfeiture statutes, in addition to CAFRA, have imposed
separate owner consent or owner knowledge requirements as necessary condi-
tions for the forfeiture,168 the courts have not always been generous to noncon-
senting, unaware, or “innocent” owners in the interpretation of these
restrictions. Some have held that the “lack-of-consent” defense requires proof
163 Those jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, which constitute the Ninth
Circuit. See Court Locator, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last
visited Dec. 20, 2012).
164 See e.g., United States v. $22,474, 246 F.3d 1212, 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001) (involving
facts similar to those of Willie Jones, finding that there was probable cause to seize the cash,
based in large part on the dog’s alert on a large quantity of cash); but see United States v.
$242,484, 351 F.3d 499, 510–11 (11th Cir. 2003) (a drug dog’s sniff of cash is “of little
value” in determining whether the currency is presently being used for narcotics trafficking
because as much as 80% of all cash in circulation contains drug residue); Humke, supra note
39, at 1300 n.2 (listing cases that discount the value of dog alerts on cash).
165 See Humke, supra note 39, at 1300 n.2.
166 See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of why forfeitures may not be contested.
167 See supra Part II.B.1.
168 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1994) (amended 2000) (In money laundering cases, “[n]o
property shall be forfeited . . . to the extent of the interest of an owner or lienholder by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner or lienholder to have been commit-
ted without [his or her] knowledge.”); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1994) (amended 2000) (In
controlled substance cases, vehicles and vessels are not forfeitable if operated by an innocent
common carrier, or if the actions prompting forfeiture were without “the knowledge, consent
or willful blindness of the owner.”); Id. at § 881(a)(7) (In controlled substance cases, “no
[real] property shall be forfeited . . . to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without [his or
her] knowledge or consent.”).
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that the owner did everything reasonably within his or her power to prevent the
proscribed use,169 or that the lack-of-knowledge defense is unavailable if the
owner “should have known” of the criminal use of the property.170 CAFRA’s
innocent owner defense is only slightly better:
[CAFRA] creates a narrower defense for innocent owners than is currently found in
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2). With respect to a property interest in
existence at the time the illegal conduct giving rise to forfeiture took place, “innocent
owner” means an owner who did not know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture or
who, upon learning of such conduct, did all that reasonably could be expected under
the circumstances to terminate such use of the property.171
Applying this standard to the Lopes case shows how the problem persists. The
Lopeses certainly knew of the marijuana patch their son had planted in the
backyard, and they probably did not do “all that reasonably could be expected”
to remove it. Indeed, they were intimidated by his threats of suicide. Moreover,
CAFRA places the burden on property owners such as the Lopeses to prove
their innocence, so inconclusive evidence on the question of innocence will not
be sufficient to protect such owners from forfeiture.
2. The Problem of Uncontested Forfeitures
The overwhelming majority of forfeitures under current procedure, both
civil and criminal, go uncontested.172 As many as 80% of these forfeitures in
federal court, representing 71% of the total amount forfeited, comes in through
uncontested proceedings.173 Prior to CAFRA, the DEA estimated that 85% of
drug case forfeitures went uncontested.174 Although both the Justice and Trea-
sury Departments feared that the passage of CAFRA would dramatically
increase the number of forfeiture challenges,175 most seizing agencies report
169 See, e.g., United States v. 785 St. Nicholas Ave., 983 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1993)
(“[C]laimants have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they took all the
precautions reasonably within their power to prevent drug sales from occurring on their
property. Once a claimant acquires knowledge that his or her property is being used for drug-
related purposes, that individual must take reasonable steps to prevent this illicit use of the
premises in order to show a lack of consent to such use.”).
170 E.g., United States v. 755 Forest Rd., 985 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1993) (defense is unavail-
able to the willfully blind); but see United States v. 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d 1558,
1561 (11th Cir. 1993) (defense is available if the claimant can prove absence of “actual
knowledge”).
171 Smith, An Insider’s View, supra note 80, at 29 (emphasis added).
172 Cassella, Civil Forfeiture, supra note 20, at 10.
173 Id.
174 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 1-4(a), at 10 n.22.
175 See, e.g., Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 54 (1999) (Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, testified
“[T]here is a real potential for an increase in the number of claims . . . if a person . . . had the
ability to get a lawyer appointed for them, [and] did not have to post a bond. . . . [T]he
potential for the filing of frivolous claims really raises pretty dramatically.”); Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 238 (1996) (Jan P. Blanton, Director, Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, Dept. of
Treasury, stated with regard to the version of CAFRA proposed in the previous Congress:
“[I]t is our belief that [the bill] would greatly increase the number of cases on an already
crowded docket of the Federal courts. Waiver of the cost bond coupled with the appointment
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the percentage of uncontested forfeitures remains reasonably steady.176
Although the Department of Justice appreciates the ease and efficiency of these
forfeitures,177 the high rate of uncontested forfeitures may be indicative of
widespread, or at least significant, compromises of due process.
a. Adequacy of Notice
The high number of uncontested forfeitures may be a product, at least in
part, of failures of notice.178 CAFRA requires that:
[I]n any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute, with
respect to which the Government is required to send written notice to interested par-
ties, such notice shall be sent in a manner to achieve proper notice as soon as practi-
cable, and in no case more than 60 days after the date of the seizure.179
The rule governing most civil forfeitures provides for public notice of the
action “in a newspaper generally circulated in the district.”180 Absent actual
notice, the third-party owner could lose his or her property on a mere showing
of probable cause and without any other hearing.181 To the extent that construc-
tive notice by publication is considered legally adequate,182 the end result may
be a forfeiture that is never heard on its merits,183 and never justified, even
under CAFRA’s preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.184
and compensation of counsel could serve to encourage litigation of even the most plainly
forfeitable property interests.”).
176 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 1-4(a), at 10 n.22 (stating that since
CAFRA, 80% of forfeitures in DEA drug cases were uncontested, and other seizing agencies
were reporting similar figures).
177 See Cassella, Civil Forfeiture, supra note 20, at 11.
178 See Johnson, supra note 142, at 1052–54 (2002) (noting that seizures of real property
can no longer be done without notice to the owner, but that personal property can still be
seized without notice). Johnson’s examples address only the initial seizure, however, not the
ultimate forfeiture.
179 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
180 FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. G(4)(a)(iv).
181 See 18 U.S.C. § 985(d)(1) (permitting seizure of real property prior to the entry of a
forfeiture order if the court determines there is probable cause and exigent circumstances for
the government to seize the property).
182 The Supreme Court held that in the context of a ship forfeiture, service on the res was
sufficient. The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815). Notice for modern forfeitures is,
as of 2009, governed by Rule G(4) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims, which for the first time includes specifics on the timing, content, and
placement of publication, and when publication is required at all. It also calls for direct
notice to anyone the government knows to be a potential claimant. So although service on
the res may be sufficient for due process purposes, it falls short of the minimum standards
now established by rule. See FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. G.
183 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) does allow a post hoc challenge to an administrative forfeiture on the
grounds of failure of notice, but the courts have been reluctant to exercise jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the forfeitures challenged under this statute. See infra note 308.
184 FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. G(2)(f) specifies that the government’s complaint must “state
sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to
meet its burden of proof at trial,” but if no claimant emerges to contest that forfeiture, the
government never actually has to carry that burden.
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b. Owner Reluctance to File a Claim
Due process concerns also arise for the owner who does receive actual,
timely notice, but who chooses not to appear and contest the forfeiture because
of fears of prosecution. Once a seizure has occurred, it is obvious that the
authorities are actively pursuing an investigation, and anyone even tangentially
connected with the property at issue has a strong incentive to lie low. Coming
forward to contest the forfeiture is certain to attract the attention of, and even
antagonize, law enforcement at the precise moment that the potential claimant
wants to appear uninvolved, cooperative, or both.
Filing a claim also can potentially compromise rights against self-incrimi-
nation. Consider, for example, Jane and Carl, who share a joint bank account
and jointly acquire a boat with money they have earned legally and saved over
the years. Later, Jane is investigated on suspicion of insider trading, although
there is no evidence that Carl was ever aware of her inside information or that
Jane was acting on it. The government seizes the boat based on evidence that
the boat was paid for out of the same account where Jane had deposited the
proceeds of her insider trading activity. Jane and Carl’s best defense to the
forfeiture may well be that her insider trading activity did not begin until after
the boat was purchased and paid off. They may have witness testimony, includ-
ing their own, that could substantiate the date upon which Jane’s involvement
in insider trading began.
If the government seizes the boat in a proceeds forfeiture, however, Jane
and Carl are unlikely to contest it. The evidence that will clearly vindicate their
claim to the property will simultaneously convict Jane of the underlying
offense. Even if Jane and Carl’s evidence does not incriminate them directly, it
may well be interpreted as a waiver of some or all of their rights against self-
incrimination, opening them up to cross-examination in that hearing and in any
subsequent trial regarding potentially incriminating matters.185
Section 981(g)(2) of Title 18 attempts to address this problem by allowing
the court to stay the forfeiture proceeding upon motion by a claimant, if (1)
“the claimant is the subject of a related criminal investigation” and (2) “contin-
uation of the forfeiture proceeding will burden the right of the claimant against
self-incrimination” in the criminal proceedings.186 The statutory provision may
provide small comfort, however, for a variety of reasons. First, a claimant, such
as Carl, may not be a subject of criminal investigation himself and therefore not
entitled to the stay. Second, Carl may be motivated by concerns about incrimi-
nating Jane rather than concerns about incriminating himself, so the stay is not
necessary to protect Carl’s right against self-incrimination. Third, Carl may be
distrustful of the courts’ willingness or ability to protect him, given popular
perception that the courts usually side with law enforcement.
The gambit, therefore, allows the government to use the threat of criminal
prosecution to intimidate property owners into waiving their rights to a hearing
on the forfeitability of their property. Procedural due process, of course, is an
185 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372–73 (1951) (a witness’s admission of an
incriminating fact constitutes a waiver of Fifth Amendment protection with respect to the
details surrounding that admission).
186 18 U.S.C. § 981(g) (2006).
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important right shared by the guilty and innocent alike; denial of a fair hearing
cannot be excused on the grounds that the defendant would not have prevailed
on her claim anyway.187 Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the claims
that owners are waiving are meritless. Even if the claimant is guilty of a crimi-
nal offense, the property may not be forfeitable: the property may not actually
bear a substantial connection to the crime or may be the proceeds of the crimi-
nal’s legal business activities. Regardless of the issue of guilt, property owners
will be victimized by a procedure that seizes such property, circumventing the
due process guarantees by extorting waivers of those rights.
The example of Jane and Carl is a proceeds forfeiture, but the problem of
waiving Fifth Amendment rights extends to the other types of forfeiture as
well. In contraband cases, the owner may wish to argue that the seized material
is not, in fact, contraband—that the drugs are legitimate over-the-counter medi-
cations or that the pornographic material is not obscene—but may be unwilling
to come forward and contest the forfeiture. Contesting the forfeiture will likely
involve admissions of ownership of the property alleged to be contraband, so
filing a claim at all plays into the hands of the criminal investigators. Potential
claimants then have powerful incentives to concede the property’s status as
contraband and allow the forfeiture to proceed uncontested.
Similar concerns will inhibit owners from coming forward in facilitating-
property forfeitures as well. Rather than argue that the property had no “sub-
stantial connection” to the crime, which would require presenting evidence on
how the crime was committed, the owner will likely waive her right to a hear-
ing and let the property be taken. Again, even if there is no substantial connec-
tion, the owner may feel compelled to hold back rather than thrust herself into
the spotlight of an ongoing criminal investigation.
Stefan Cassella has cited the high rate of uncontested forfeitures as evi-
dence that the system is working efficiently, and that owners are freely conced-
ing the forfeitability of their property.188 But the uncontested forfeitures just as
likely reflect strategic behavior, as described above, of individuals with colora-
ble claims who merely find the risks of asserting such claims to outweigh the
value of the property that is arguably improperly seized.
c. Access to Justice
Finally, uncontested forfeitures may be evidence of an access-to-justice
problem. If the individual cannot afford an attorney—a common enough situa-
tion made even more likely when the defendant’s assets have just been
seized—or is otherwise intimidated by or unable to navigate the justice system,
her legitimate claims may never be asserted.
CAFRA helps to some degree here by ensuring that an indigent person
whose home is seized can get an attorney from the Legal Services Corporation
appointed to represent her, and by allowing a court-appointed defense lawyer in
a criminal case to contest related forfeitures as well.189 But, CAFRA stops
187 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (students suspended without procedural
due process were entitled to nominal damages for the violation of those rights, even if the
suspension was fully justified on the merits and would have been imposed in any case).
188 Cassella, Civil Forfeitures, supra note 20, at 11.
189 18 U.S.C. §§ 983(b)(1)(A) & (2)(A).
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short of providing attorneys to every indigent claimant, and even non-indigent
claimants contesting their forfeiture can be bankrupted by legal fees, as hap-
pened to Mr. Munnerlyn, the air charter service operator cited in the CAFRA
House Report.190 Moreover, if property owners perceive the deck to be stacked
against them,191 they may well choose to forgo meritorious claims rather than
incur the expense of bringing them.
For all of these reasons, the high rate of uncontested forfeitures may be
evidence of a serious problem in protecting the rights of property owners. Due
process may demand more than the current procedural regime provides.
D. Bad Incentives for Law Enforcement
Lucrative forfeiture opportunities can also warp law enforcement priori-
ties.192 Because forfeiture schemes allow law enforcement to retain seized
assets, the law enforcement agencies’ financial incentives may distort the pol-
icy judgment regarding how to allocate police resources and will exert constant
pressure on law enforcement to overreach when pursuing a lucrative forfeiture
opportunity.193 Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen have argued that this consti-
tutes a conflict of interest, given “the overwhelmingly dispositive role of dis-
cretionary prosecutorial decisions in a system where few cases ever go to trial:
in most cases, the integrity of the system depends primarily on the fairness of
the law enforcement branch.”194 They conclude that “[o]ne could hardly design
an incentive system better calculated to bias law enforcement decisions than the
present forfeiture laws.”195 Additionally, the exclusionary rule does not deter
overreaching by law enforcement agencies because it will not bar the forfeiture
of illegally seized property.196
Congress, when it was debating CAFRA, was concerned about these
incentives as well. Mark Kappelhoff, Legislative Counsel for the American
Civil Liberties Union, testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary in
1996 that evidence suggested that law enforcement was pursuing assets at the
expense of pursuing convictions, perverting justice by allowing those with sub-
stantial assets to forfeit them as part of their plea negotiations:
[M]ajor drug dealers are allowed to barter their way out of lengthy prison terms by
prosecutors who have become intoxicated with the thought of huge sums of money to
be obtained from drug forfeiture assets. Conversely, low level drug users with no
190 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
191 See supra Sections III.B and III.C.1; see also Moores, supra note 142, at 799 (“[T]he
increased burden appears to have done little in terms of making civil asset forfeitures more
difficult for the government to obtain, as 80% of forfeitures [still] go uncontested.”).
192 Richard Miniter, Ill-Gotten Gains, REASON.COM (Aug. 1, 1993, 12:00 AM), http://rea-
son.com/archives/1993/08/01/ill-gotten-gains/.
193 See Chi, supra note 61, at 1637, 1665 (suggesting that the financial incentives for law
enforcement are the corrupting influence, and that no reform can be meaningful or effective
until those incentives are removed by, for example, diverting forfeited assets to public
schools rather than to law enforcement).
194 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 61, at 62 (1998).
195 Id.
196 See SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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assets or no information to swap are exposed to the full wrath of the harsh drug
laws—mandatory minimums and nonparoleable sentences.197
The suggestion, of course, is that plea bargaining with forfeitures allows
criminals to buy off prosecutors, with cash, in return for lighter sentences, and
that the financial incentives are so strong that it may be unreasonable to expect
law enforcement to resist such temptations. Indeed, a notorious 1990 memo
from the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys in the Department of Justice is
often cited as an example of the depth of the government’s financial interest,
and how easily it can skew official Department of Justice policy:
We must significantly increase production to reach our budget target. . . . Failure to
achieve the $470 million projection would expose the Department’s forfeiture pro-
gram to criticism and undermine confidence in our budget projections. Every effort
must be made to increase forfeiture income during the remaining three months of
[fiscal year] 1990.198
In any case, the powerful financial incentives remain in the post-CAFRA
world. That alone threatens to distort process and undermine justice.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING FORFEITURE PROCEDURE
Beyond these criticisms, or perhaps underlying them all, is the problem of
ill-defined policy objectives for the forfeiture scheme that is now operating
under federal law. As a result, the procedure itself is not properly tailored to
further legitimate objectives and therefore yields anomalous and inequitable
outcomes like those discussed above.199 The answer to this problem lies not in
tweaking the standards and application, as was done in CAFRA, but in recon-
ceptualizing forfeitures altogether.
A. The Civil–Criminal Distinction
The primary distinction made by the federal forfeiture procedure, between
civil and criminal, is not a meaningful one, or at least is not tied to compelling
and well-defined public policy. Both are occasioned by illegal conduct, and
both serve essentially the same “punitive and deterrent” purposes. But, for idio-
syncratic historical reasons, as already noted, they are treated entirely differ-
ently as a matter of procedure: criminal jurisdiction is in personam, after
197 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 264 (1996) (statement of Mark Kappelhoff, Legislative Counsel for
the A.C.L.U.). Kappelhoff cited the BOSTON GLOBE, which reviewed major drug trafficking
cases and reported that where $10,000 or more was forfeited, “75 percent of the drug dealers
ended up charged with either lesser crimes or were allowed to plead to lower sentences.
Some even received no time in jail.” Id.
198 Id. at 288 (statement of E.E. Edwards, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (quot-
ing the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 38 U.S.A. BULL. 180
(1990)).
199 See description of the plight of Mrs. Bennis (forfeiture of car husband used with a prosti-
tute), supra Part II.A.1.b; of the Lopes family (forfeiture of house when mentally disturbed
son cultivates marijuana in the backyard), supra Part II.A.4; of Mr. Munnerlyn (forfeiture of
air charter plane when client turns out to be a drug lord), supra Part II.B.5; and of Mr. Jones
(forfeiture of cash because carrying so much of it is part of the profile of drug dealers), supra
Part III.B.
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conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, while civil jurisdiction is in rem, pro-
ceeding against the property with much lighter evidentiary burdens.
Neither logic nor good public policy supports the distinction between
criminal and civil forfeitures.200 CAFRA, in its effort to address the worst
anomalies in forfeiture procedure, attempted to close the gap a bit. Under
CAFRA, prosecutors now enjoy the option of pursuing the same property based
on the same offense under either approach, since CAFRA makes criminal for-
feiture available everywhere civil forfeiture is already available.201 Thus,
CAFRA attempts to treat the two procedures as virtually interchangeable, push-
ing Congress’s decided preference for criminal forfeitures.202 However, the
theoretical bases of the two approaches are quite independent and arguably
inconsistent.
The inconsistency comes from the fact that a civil forfeiture is based on
the guilt of the object, and the innocence of the owner was historically deemed
to be irrelevant. The criminal forfeiture is based entirely on the guilt of the
owner, whose property is confiscated because of his guilt. So in the first case,
we argue that we are not, in fact, punishing the owner (innocent or not), as in
Bennis, because the guilt of the property alone is enough to justify the forfei-
200 See CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-2, at 837 (“If the forfeiture
of the instrument used to commit a crime is remedial in a civil case because it achieves some
important social purpose, it is equally remedial in a criminal case. The nature of the relation-
ship between the property and the crime, and the social and political objectives of the forfei-
ture, cannot depend on the procedure by which the forfeiture is accomplished.”).
201 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, sec. 16, 114 Stat. 202
(2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (2006).
202 Section Sixteen of CAFRA is specifically entitled “Encouraging Use of Criminal Forfei-
ture as an Alternative to Civil Forfeiture,” although the terms of Section Sixteen merely
permit the criminal forfeiture rather than encourage it. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, sec. 16. Clearly Congress hoped criminal forfeiture would be
used more, in place of civil forfeiture, because there are fewer problems with the criminal
procedure. And it appears that Congress may have achieved its objective. Since CAFRA,
federal forfeitures have shifted significantly away from civil forfeitures in favor of criminal
forfeitures, as shown on the chart below compiled from the UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’
STATISTICAL REPORTS Table 20 (1992–2003) & Table 16 (2004–2007), available at http://
www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/foiamanuals.html.
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASSET FORFEITURES FILED BY U.S. ATTORNEYS, 1992–2007
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Civil Forfeitures filed 5083 4399 2941 2193 1818 1964 2053 1954 2246 1807 2009 2156 2235 2251 2181 2105
Criminal Forfeitures Filed 721 799 765 1387 1689 1214 1673 1517 1689 1992 2580 3462 3785 3800 4053 5131
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ture. In the second case, we justify the forfeiture only if and precisely because
the owner is found guilty.
B. New Distinctions Based on the Nature of the Forfeiture
The more serious problem, however, is not that the law makes distinctions
where it should not, but that the law does not make distinctions where it should.
To better understand and to better apply the public policy underlying federal
forfeitures, the law needs to formally recognize a new taxonomy for forfeitures,
distinguishing (1) contraband forfeitures, (2) proceeds forfeitures, and (3) facil-
itating-property forfeitures from each other.
The anomalies and injustices inherent in modern forfeiture practice can be
traced in large measure to the government’s use of one procedure to effect
forfeitures in sharply dissimilar cases. Procedures for virtually automatic forfei-
ture that may be appropriate for the seizure of sawed-off shotguns (indisputable
contraband), for example, are applied for the forfeiture of the Lopes family
home (mere facilitating property, where the owner is not the wrongdoer). In
testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1996, the Depart-
ment of Justice acknowledged that the one-size-fits-all approach creates a risk
of unfairly depriving people of their property:
It may be that [forfeiture] procedures were adequate when the object of the forfeiture
was contraband or something else with no legitimate purpose, but when we move to
the forfeiture of peoples’ houses, cars, businesses and bank accounts, we need to
ensure that the forfeiture is as fair as possible.203
Unfortunately, the Committee went no further with this idea, and the terms of
CAFRA do not make this critical distinction.
A more promising approach is to adopt separate procedural requirements,
including a different burden of proof,204 for each of the different types of for-
feitures, procedures tailored to protect the legitimate interests and public policy
unique to each type of forfeitable property. The three categories will be consid-
ered in turn.
1. Contraband—Forfeitable to Protect Public Safety and Health
The concept of a contraband forfeiture is summarized succinctly in the
Federal Rules Decisions:
The simplest forfeitures, both conceptually and practically, are forfeitures of
contraband, that is, property the mere possession of which is illegal. Justification for
this type of forfeiture is self-evident: because the law prohibits the individual from
possessing the property in the first place, forfeiture is an essential element of the
203 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 220 (1996) (statement of Stefan Cassella, Deputy Chief, Asset For-
feiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice).
204 The House, clearly troubled by facilitating-property forfeitures, such as Mrs. Bennis’s
car and Mr. Munnerlyn’s charter airplane, sought to require a higher burden of proof: clear
and convincing evidence. When members of the Senate Judiciary Committee balked at this
high burden, it was perhaps thinking of contraband or proceeds forfeitures, which should be
far more straightforward and easier to effect. What no one discussed in this exchange was
the possibility of applying a higher standard of proof to facilitating-property forfeitures than
to the others.
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remedy. This is particularly true when the contraband is a threat to public health or
morals—e.g., obscene material, sawed-off shotguns, adulterated food, or illegal
drugs. Seizure of these materials serves the important function of removing them
from public circulation where they may do damage. Because there can be no legiti-
mate claim to such property, procedural rights of “owners” in confiscation proceed-
ings are not a significant concern. Contraband seizures typically do not result in
significant revenues for the government.205
Of course, there is no “innocent-owner” problem with contraband206 because it
is illegal to possess the property in the first place.207
Notice and hearing requirements for contraband forfeitures are also far
less compelling. Unless the property’s status as contraband is at issue, there is
no particular need to provide notice or other aspects of procedural due process
when seizing such property. On the other hand, there may be a contestable
issue as to whether the property is, in fact, contraband (e.g., whether the seized
pornographic materials are actually obscene).208 It is in this respect only that
notice and hearing may be important in a contraband forfeiture. But burdens of
proof are less important, because the facts should be quite apparent: the seized
property is what it is. Contested claims of ownership or innocence are irrele-
vant, and there is no issue over the source of the property or how strong the
nexus is between the property and the crime. In the typical case, the court must
simply apply the law to determine whether this property meets the legal defini-
tion of forfeitable contraband.
205 Pimentel, supra note 2, at 6.
206 It is conceivable that someone could be an “innocent owner” of contraband, in that they
acquired it without knowing that it was contraband—if, for example, they acquired the con-
tents of a warehouse without knowing that such contents included contraband. But these
innocent owners still cannot assert a legitimate claim to the property. Their innocence (lack
of mens rea) may be a defense to criminal penalties for such possession, but it cannot serve
to block the forfeiture because they can have no property right in contraband to begin with.
207 Even CAFRA acknowledges that the innocent-owner defense will not apply to contra-
band. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(4) (2006) (“[N]o person may assert an ownership interest under
this subsection in contraband or other property that it is illegal to possess.”). This provision
in CAFRA is a necessary acknowledgement of the profound differences between different
types of forfeitures. Innocent-owner defenses are important only for instrumentality forfeit-
ures and, in very limited circumstances, for proceeds forfeitures. But CAFRA’s caveat in this
respect notwithstanding, all three are typically lumped together under the same procedure.
208 Obscene materials are not protected by the First Amendment and are illegal in every
state. Drawing the line between pornography that is protected by the First Amendment and
obscene material that can be legitimately suppressed has been a notoriously difficult busi-
ness, illustrated most popularly with Justice Potter Stewart’s definition of obscenity: “I know
it when I see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The
definition of obscenity and its application are vitally important because they define the limits
of First Amendment protection. The implications for contraband forfeitures are obvious. If
forfeitures are too easy, and material alleged to be obscene is forfeited without a proper
finding that it is obscene, the result could easily be a violation of the First Amendment. Cf.
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559–60 (1993) (finding no First Amendment
violation for the forfeiture of non-obscene pornography along with material specifically
found to be obscene upon a finding of a RICO violation; four justices—Kennedy, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Souter—dissented on the First Amendment issue).
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2. Proceeds—Forfeitable as Unjust Enrichment
Consider, next, proceeds of crime. The primary principle here is an
entirely different one than that for contraband. It is primarily one of denying the
wrongdoer the benefit of ill-gotten gains.
Congress has also authorized the forfeiture of property generated by illegal
activity, in some circumstances. More recently, it has authorized—in the case of
criminal forfeiture at least—the forfeiture of substitute assets when the actual pro-
ceeds normally subject to confiscation are no longer available. These forfeitures are
justified on the principle of avoiding unjust enrichment; the wrongdoer should not be
permitted to profit from his crime. This type of forfeiture, first witnessed in RICO,
has been aimed primarily at those activities likely to generate a large payoff for the
perpetrators.209
As already discussed, proceeds forfeitures started with RICO210 and
money-laundering statutes211 but quickly spread to prosecutions of drug crimes
as well. Under CAFRA, proceeds forfeitures are now available for a broad
range of criminal activity. Congressional motivation for expanding the availa-
bility of proceeds forfeitures is clear: to “depriv[e] criminals of the fruits of
their criminal acts.”212 Department of Justice officials have echoed those
thoughts to Congress on multiple occasions, including this example from 1997:
The attractiveness of asset forfeiture and a reason for its growth in the United
States is very simple: it takes the profit out of crime. Asset forfeiture is a program
that cuts to the heart of most criminal activity, dismantling criminal syndicates in a
way that simple incarceration never could.213
The Justice Department had made a similar pitch to the previous Congress:
“Many criminals fear the loss of their vacation homes, fancy cars, businesses
and bloated bank accounts far more than the prospect of a jail sentence.”214
Accordingly, proceeds forfeitures are important in ensuring that “crime doesn’t
pay.”
209 Pimentel, supra note 2, at 6 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B)–(F) (2006) as an example
of a statute authorizing the forfeiture of proceeds of crime, and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (as
amended in 1986) as an example of a statute allowing the forfeiture of substituted assets).
210 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
211 18 U.S.C. §§ 981–982.
212 H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, at 35 (1997). Although this House Report accompanied an ear-
lier bill, its sentiments were reflected in the comments of other legislators at the time
CAFRA was debated and passed. 145 CONG. REC. H4851 (1999) (statement of Rep. Deborah
Pryce) (“Few dispute that it is proper for the government to seize the yachts, planes and
mansions of convicted drug dealers who finance their possessions with illegal drug
money.”); 146 CONG. REC. S1759 (2000) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“All of us here
are committed to depriving criminals of the proceeds of crime.”).
213 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 237 (1996) (statement of Jan P. Blanton, Director, Executive Office
for Asset Forfeiture, Dept. of Treasury).
214 H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 23 (1997) (quoting Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act:
Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 112 (1996)
(statement of Stefan Cassella, Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Sec-
tion, Criminal Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice)).
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This policy reflects a very unique status because the policy is not punitive
in nature but is nonetheless rooted in deterrence.215 It deters not by threatening
punishment but by denying the would-be criminal certain benefits of his or her
crime.
Unlike contraband, there is nothing inherently offensive in the property
itself, only in the means by which it was acquired. But ill-gotten gains are not,
as a matter of equity, something that the property holder is entitled to retain, so
forfeiture is appropriate. This “unjust enrichment” policy justification is a com-
pelling one, reinforced and respected by centuries of jurisprudence in legal and
equitable restitution.216
However, the unjust enrichment policy is compelling only when appropri-
ately limited to depriving a defendant of the benefits of his crime. Justice
Department strategies undermine this policy foundation in two important ways.
First, the government has attempted to define proceeds broadly to include not
merely profit, but gross revenues generated from the criminal activity.217 Sec-
ond, it has argued for money judgments in forfeiture actions on the basis of
joint and several liability,218 divesting lowly accessories or co-conspirators of
215 The fact that proceeds forfeitures are not punitive is extremely important, both in terms
of Eighth Amendment “excessive fines” provisions, and in terms of determinate sentencing
concerns, both discussed infra at Part IV.B.3.a. Most courts find that forfeitures of proceeds
from a criminal enterprise are inherently nonpunitive. See Amanda Seals Bersinger, Note,
Grossly Disproportional to Whose Offense? Why the (Mis)Application of Constitutional
Jurisprudence on Proceeds Forfeiture Matters, 45 GA. L. REV. 841, 845–46 (2011) (recog-
nizing the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth circuits as holding this view). However, recently
the Fourth Circuit joined the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits in finding that forfeiture of pro-
ceeds from a criminal enterprise are not per se nonpunitive, and should, therefore, draw
Eighth Amendment scrutiny. See United States v. Jalaram, Inc., 599 F.3d 347, 354–57 (4th
Cir. 2010) (applying the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines prohibition analysis to pro-
ceeds forfeiture); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that
courts can reduce forfeiture of illegal proceeds to make the forfeiture proportional to the
seriousness of the offense so as not to violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
excessive fines); United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2007) (apply-
ing Eighth Amendment analysis to proceeds forfeiture in a RICO case).
216 RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ELAINE W. SHOBEN & MICHAEL B. KELLY, PRINCIPLES OF REME-
DIES LAW 110 (2007).
217 See SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, supra note 78, § 4.03 n.185 (“The government
generally urges the courts to interpret ‘proceeds’ to mean gross receipts.”). The Department
of Justice position appears to be disingenuously taken, testifying to Congress in CAFRA
proceedings that proceeds forfeitures are to deny a criminal the benefit of his crime, and then
in turn arguing to courts that proceeds include gross receipts (which clearly exceed the “ben-
efit” of a crime). See also infra p. 38 and note 221.
218 See Bersinger, supra note 215, at 867 (noting that where cases involve co-conspirators,
courts may impose joint and several liability). Originally, joint and several liability was
permitted with respect to proceed forfeitures when the government could not determine
exactly how benefits of a crime had been allocated to co-conspirators. See United States v.
Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986) (“If the government were required to deter-
mine the precise allocation of racketeering proceeds between two offenders before the court
could impose forfeiture, the effectiveness of the remedy would be impaired substantially.
The offenders would simply have to mask the allocation of the proceeds to avoid forfeiting
them altogether. If the government can prove the amount of the proceeds and identify a finite
group of people receiving the proceeds, it defeats the purpose of the provision to hold that
the proceeds cannot be forfeited because the government cannot prove exactly which defen-
dant received how much of the pot.”). However, the Fourth Circuit extended this rationale
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proceeds far in excess of their profit from or involvement in the criminal enter-
prise.219 These arguments are inconsistent not only with the Department’s
statements to Congress that these forfeitures are about taking the profitability
out of crime,220 but also with the Department’s arguments before other courts
that because proceeds forfeitures are “remedial” and not punitive, the Eighth
Amendment does not apply. As David B. Smith observes:
Whether proceeds forfeiture is truly a remedial measure depends on how “pro-
ceeds” is defined. If it means the gross receipts from the criminal activity, as opposed
to net receipts, then it can be harshly punitive. The government generally urges the
courts to interpret “proceeds” to mean gross receipts. At the same time, and without
acknowledging any contradiction, the government contends that proceeds forfeiture
is inherently a remedial measure that merely deprives criminals of their ill-gotten
gains. The government cannot have it both ways.221
Whether the government’s position on this issue is disingenuous or merely the
product of “too many cooks” is beside the point. When the government seizes
proceeds in excess of the wrongdoer’s profit, the forfeiture goes beyond ill-
gotten gains and operates as a punitive fine, which is inconsistent with the
policy foundation for proceeds forfeitures. The better argument, more consis-
tent with the legislative history of both RICO and CAFRA, is that proceeds
forfeitures should be limited to ill-gotten gains, on what is essentially a theory
of unjust enrichment.222 Indeed, the failure to articulate this policy foundation
more clearly and enforce it more transparently is a large part of the present
problem with proceeds forfeitures; it has enabled the government to extract
punitive fines—or extract guilty pleas with threats of crippling, life-long, non-
dischargeable debt—under a proceeds forfeiture regime that was never
intended to do anything other than deny the criminal the benefit of his crime.
In 2008, the Supreme Court faced the question of how to define “pro-
ceeds” under a money-laundering statute in United States v. Santos, and inter-
and permitted disgorgement of drug proceeds from a defendant whom the prosecution knew
was in excess of the amount he received from the conspiracy. See United States v. McHan,
101 F.3d 1027, 1041–43 (4th Cir. 1996). In an attempt to confine government overreaching
under the McHan decision, the Fourth Circuit determined it would use the Excessive Fines
Clause to prevent abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Jalaram, Inc., 599 F.3d at 355.
219 See, e.g., United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2008) (a single, unem-
ployed mother acted as a drug runner for a marijuana conspiracy, earning only $37,284, but
was subjected to a $3 million judgment for the full amount of the gross proceeds obtained by
all the conspirators).
220 See supra notes 212–214 and accompanying text.
221 SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, supra note 78, § 4.03 n.185 (“In the negotiations
over the CAFRA, Senator Leahy pointed this out [that the government cannot have it both
ways] to the DoJ when he persuaded it to yield to his proposed definition of the key term
“proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2).”). On the issue of excessive fines, Smith also observes
that “Because a forfeiture order based on the theory of joint and several liability cannot be
characterized as purely remedial in nature, it is subject to scrutiny under the Excessive Fines
Clause.” Id. § 13.02[5].
222 See, e.g., United States v. $152,160, 680 F. Supp. 354, 356–57 (D. Colo. 1988) (discuss-
ing the legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 showing con-
gressional intent that the “purpose[ ] of § 881 civil forfeiture proceedings include ‘removing
the incentive to engage in the drug trade by denying drug dealers the proceeds of ill[-]gotten
gains.’ ” (quoting United States v. 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 994 (E.D. Pa.
1986))).
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preted it to mean “profits.”223 “Proceeds” was undefined in the statute and,
consistent with the rule of lenity, the Court declined to interpret the term
broadly to mean “receipts.”224 The government had argued that limiting “pro-
ceeds” to “profits” (i.e., to actual unjust enrichment) would unnecessarily bur-
den the government with a complicated accounting exercise in order to prove
money-laundering.225 Justice Scalia was dismissive of these concerns:
It is true that the “profits” interpretation demands more from the Government
than the “receipts” interpretation. Not so much more, however, as to render such a
disposition inconceivable—as proved by the fact that Congress has imposed similar
proof burdens upon the prosecution elsewhere. . . . It is untrue that the added burdens
“serve no discernible purpose.” They ensure that the severe money-laundering penal-
ties will be imposed only for the removal of profits from criminal activity . . . .226
At the urging of the Department of Justice, Congress responded to Santos by
amending the statute in question to define proceeds as gross receipts for pur-
poses of money laundering,227 but there remains considerable inconsistency in
the statutory definitions of “proceeds” for purposes of asset forfeiture, includ-
ing Section 981(a)(2) under Title 18, which specifically limits it to profits in
subsection (B),228 but which states that it is “not limited to the net gain or
profit” in subsection (A).229 The conflict, however, is not a mere technicality. It
reflects the core policy justification for proceeds forfeitures in the first place:
the broader definition of proceeds can be justified only if those forfeitures are
meant to be punitive, which was apparently never the original intention.
Characterizing proceeds forfeitures as “unjust enrichment” actions high-
lights that the underlying policy is not confined to deterrence or to actions
against a wrongdoer. Indeed, the traditional basis for unjust enrichment actions
223 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 513–14 (2008).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 519. Indeed, these same concerns were sufficient to persuade Congress to amend
the money-laundering statute to reverse Santos. Richard C. Alexander, “Cost Savings” as
Proceeds of Crime: A Comparative Study of the United States and the United Kingdom, 45
INT’L LAW. 749, 763 (2011) (“U.S. law enforcement . . . viewed with horror the prospect of
having to undertake a complex accounting exercise in each and every money laundering
prosecution, [and] . . . Congress amended section 1956 the following year . . . .”).
226 Santos, 553 U.S. at 519–20 (some citations omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (crimi-
nal forfeiture provision requiring determination of “gross profits or other proceeds”); and 21
U.S.C. § 853(a) (same)).
227 Alexander, supra note 225, at 785.
228 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(B) (2006) (“In cases involving lawful goods or lawful services
that are sold or provided in an illegal manner, the term ‘proceeds’ means the amount of
money acquired through the illegal transactions resulting in the forfeiture, less the direct
costs incurred in providing the goods or services. The claimant shall have the burden of
proof with respect to the issue of direct costs. The direct costs shall not include any part of
the overhead expenses of the entity providing the goods or services, or any part of the
income taxes paid by the entity.”).
229 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A) (“In cases involving illegal goods, illegal services, unlaw-
ful activities, and telemarketing and health care fraud schemes, the term ‘proceeds’ means
property of any kind obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of the commission of the
offense giving rise to forfeiture, and any property traceable thereto, and is not limited to the
net gain or profit realized from the offense.”); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) (Supp. 2010) (“[T]he
term ‘proceeds’ means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indi-
rectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such
activity.”).
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is not necessarily the guilt of the defendant. Equitable restitution is appropriate
also when the defendant is entirely innocent, enriched by someone else’s mis-
take or through the wrongdoing of another. If a homeowner finds stolen cash
hidden in her tool shed, stashed there by a thief, she is not entitled to keep it.
Similarly, if there is a “bank error in your favor,” you have no legal right to
retain the mistakenly conferred benefit, the assumptions of Parker Bros.’
Monopoly notwithstanding.230 Either of these scenarios would result in “unjust
enrichment,” and equity, if not law, will require restitution from these innocent
beneficiaries every bit as much as it would require restitution from the person
who committed the crime or the error.231
Thus, the policy for proceeds forfeitures strongly suggests a limitation on
the rights of innocent donees of forfeitable property. Their receipt of wrong-
fully obtained property is an unjust enrichment, quite regardless of their inno-
cence, so the property should be forfeitable, notwithstanding the donative
transfer.232 In other words, innocent owners of criminal proceeds who gave no
value for the forfeitable property should not be protected by an innocent-owner
defense. If they are bona fide purchasers for value, an innocent-owner defense
should protect them, but whatever “value” they gave for the property should be
forfeitable as traceable proceeds or, alternatively, as substitute assets.
With respect to the procedure for a proceeds forfeiture, the critical issue to
be decided by the court is whether the property is indeed the product of crimi-
nal activity. The parties need an adequate opportunity to contest and litigate
that factual question, which may be a very difficult one; it may involve tracing
funds through commingled accounts and proving what funds were used for
what purposes. Given the range of factual questions that must be resolved in
these cases, therefore, procedural due process, in terms of meaningful notice
and hearing requirements, is far more important in proceeds forfeitures than it
would be in contraband cases.233
As already noted, the policy rationale behind proceeds forfeitures creates a
compelling case for allowing the forfeiture of substitute assets. Again, this is a
sharp contrast with contraband forfeitures, where the public policy is to remove
the contraband from circulation to protect public health and safety. Forfeiture
of substitute assets, the money received when the contraband was sold, for
example, does nothing to serve that purpose. On the other hand, for proceeds
230 The Monopoly board game includes a Community Chest card that states: “Bank error in
your favor[.] Collect $200[.]” Under the rules of the game, the player who draws that card is
permitted to retain the windfall, even though equity, if not law, would afford the bank a
remedy.
231 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 373 (2d ed. 1993) (“Benefits to defendant from
money or services without misconduct . . . Restitution is . . . appropriate when the plaintiff
mistakenly delivers the wrong goods or delivers the right goods to the wrong person.”).
232 Portions of CAFRA actually run contrary to this, since the innocent owner defense
appears to apply to donative transferees of proceeds forfeitures, under certain conditions. See
discussion of the bona-fide-purchaser-for-value rule supra note 104 and accompanying text.
This provision makes no distinction between facilitating-property forfeitures and proceeds
forfeitures. Applying the principles advocated in this article, it may be warranted for the
former but not for the latter.
233 Contraband forfeitures, as suggested above in Part IV.B.1, are unlikely to raise factual
issues, only the straightforward legal issue as to whether the property itself is, in fact,
contraband.
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forfeitures, the public policy in undoing any unjust enrichment would be
entirely defeated if the property holder could avoid forfeiture by transferring
the property to family members or exchanging it for other property of value.
3. Facilitating Property
Still different is the property used to facilitate crime, which is forfeited for
entirely different reasons: (a) punishment, (b) deterrence, (c) an incentive for
property owners to take care, and (d) removal of the means of crime from
circulation. The most compelling and oft-cited of these rationales, the second
and third, have been articulated elsewhere:
Property used in the commission of a crime may also be subject to forfeiture.
Vehicles are often confiscated under these provisions, as well as real property used
for the manufacture or cultivation of illegal narcotics. This type of forfeiture has been
justified on two separate grounds: (1) it provides greater deterrence for the wrong-
doer by prescribing an additional penalty for the crime, and (2) it provides an incen-
tive to the property owner to take precautions that prevent others from using his
property for criminal activity.234
Seizure of the car used for a liaison with a prostitute in Bennis v. Michigan was
justified on this “facilitating property” theory.235 There is nothing inherently
bad about the automobile (as there is in the case of contraband), and there is
nothing unseemly about how it was acquired (as there is in the case of pro-
ceeds).236 This is legitimate property acquired in a legitimate way. The forfei-
ture is allowed only because the property has been misused.237
The justification for this type of forfeiture is easily the weakest, and cer-
tainly the most problematic. The Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo acknowl-
edged that forfeitures of facilitating property serve “punitive and deterrent
purposes” sufficient to uphold them against constitutional challenge even
against the innocent owners.238 As to the latter, punishment certainly does not
apply, but “confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exer-
cise greater care in transferring possession of their property.”239 Finally, facili-
tating-property forfeitures may serve public policy by removing the tools of
crime from circulation, where they might otherwise be used for future criminal
activity.240
So there are four policy rationales for forfeitures of facilitating property:
(a) punishment, (b) deterrence, (c) incentives to greater care, and (d) removal of
facilitating property from circulation. The first two apply only to the wrong-
doer’s property, the third applies only to the property of third-party owners, and
the fourth has no such limitation. Each will be considered in turn.
234 Pimentel, supra note 2, at 6.
235 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
236 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965).
237 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 443, 447.
238 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974).
239 Id. at 688.
240 Id. at 679.
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a. Punishment and the Attendant Problems of Proportionality and
Uniformity
The Supreme Court in Austin v. United States, specifically recognized that
“forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically
have been understood, at least in part, as punishment.”241 The punishment
rationale appears to be straightforward, but it can raise serious questions of
proportionality and uniformity in criminal punishment.
i. Proportionality—Excessive Fines Under the Eighth
Amendment
The proportionality problem comes from two sources. First, the forfeiture
is “extra” punishment, over and above the prescribed criminal penalty for the
offense. The second is that the amount of the forfeiture, which must be charac-
terized as a “fine” in the context of punishment, is almost entirely unrelated to
the severity or seriousness of the offense.242 If sentencing guidelines are care-
fully calibrated to apply an appropriate level of punishment to each crime
according to its seriousness, the wild-card forfeiture factor has the potential to
disrupt the entire regime. Someone who completes a drug deal in his own
$20,000 car will suffer the criminal penalty plus an additional $20,000 “fine” in
the form of the forfeiture of the car. The person who completes the same drug
deal in the back of a taxi gets the same criminal penalty, but without the
$20,000 fine.243 This disparity in punishment is difficult, if not impossible, to
justify.244
This compelling problem of proportionality is illustrated by the case
United States v. Bajakajian, involving a man who attempted to take a large sum
of cash out of the United States without properly declaring it on the customs
241 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993).
242 The word “proportionality” is commonly used to denote Eighth Amendment issues. In
this article the term is used in a more general sense. Proportionality is an important first
principle in criminal punishment. Egregious breaches of that principle may constitute cruel
and unusual punishment violative of Eighth Amendment guarantees, but the principle of
proportionality is neither defined by nor confined to Eighth Amendment thresholds. See
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (“We explained ‘that it is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ We have
repeatedly applied this proportionality precept in later cases interpreting the Eighth Amend-
ment.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 367 (1910)).
243 Although the perpetrator of the crime would not suffer the $20,000 fine, the taxi owner,
who would normally not be subject to criminal penalties for a crime that occurs in her cab,
could be “fined” $20,000 for a crime she did not commit, if and when her taxi is subjected to
civil forfeiture.
244 One rationale might be if there were a public policy to encourage people who commit
crimes to use others’ property or public property to do so. Perhaps they will be easier to
catch and police if they are forced out of their own homes and their own cars to engage in
criminal activity. On the other hand, criminal activity conducted in the privacy of one’s own
car or home creates less opportunity for accidental or collateral victimization. Mr. Bennis,
when he engaged the prostitute, could have avoided forfeiture of his car if he had exited the
car and engaged her in a public place, or if he had trespassed into the property of another for
purposes of the liaison. Neither of these seem like actions the law should be encouraging.
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forms.245 His failure to so declare was found to be based on “cultural differ-
ences”—he was a member of the Armenian minority in Syria and had a
profound distrust of government.246 Moreover, there was never a suggestion
that the cash was improperly held or connected in any way with illegal activity.
The sole violation was a failure to disclose.247
The Supreme Court had already recognized in Austin that the Excessive
Fines Clause would apply to civil in rem forfeitures, precisely because those
forfeitures are, at least in part, punishment.248 Consistent with this, the
Supreme Court ultimately held that forfeiture of the full amount Mr. Bajakajian
failed to disclose—more than $350,000—for such a minor offense would con-
stitute an “excessive fine” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.249 Instead,
the Court upheld a forfeiture of a much smaller amount, $15,000, in a virtually
arbitrary assessment made by the district court.250 Although the refusal to allow
the full $350,000 to be forfeited is a salutary recognition of the proportionality
problem inherent in forfeitures of facilitating property,251 the Eighth Amend-
ment is a very blunt instrument for ensuring proportionality. The lesson learned
from the Bajakajian case is that $350,000 is an excessive fine for this particular
offense, and that $15,000 is not an excessive fine for the same offense.252 This
gives very little guidance to courts as to what the permissible limits for forfeit-
ures are for this offense, much less for other offenses.253
245 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
246 Id. at 326 (“The District Court further found that respondent had failed to report that he
was taking the currency out of the United States because of fear stemming from ‘cultural
differences’: Respondent, who had grown up as a member of the Armenian minority in
Syria, had a ‘distrust for the Government.’ ”).
247 Id.
248 Austin, 509 U.S. at 621–22.
249 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337.
250 Id. at 348 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“By affirming, the majority in effect approves
a . . . $15,000 forfeiture.”). The majority did not specifically assess the appropriateness of
the $15,000 forfeiture because the defendant failed to appeal that aspect of the district
court’s ruling. Id. at 337 n.11.
251 Technically speaking, the money in Bajakajian does not meet the definition of an
“instrumentality.” The Court recognized that because it was not the “actual means” of com-
mitting the crime of “failure to disclose.” Id. at 334 n.9. However, the Court noted that this
was not an in rem civil proceeding but a criminal proceeding against the individual, with
forfeiture prescribed in the statute. Moreover, the Court noted that “It is . . . irrelevant
whether respondent’s currency is an instrumentality; the forfeiture is punitive, and the test
for the excessiveness of a punitive forfeiture involves solely a proportionality determina-
tion.” Id. at 333–34. For the analytical purposes of this paper, this forfeiture is functionally
equivalent to “instrumentality” forfeitures because (1) the property forfeited may be legally
owned and has legitimate value (unlike contraband), and (2) the property was earned and
acquired legally, with full and untainted title prior to the infraction (unlike proceeds). As
long as instrumentality forfeitures are punitive, even in part, the Excessive Fines Clause will
apply. Id. at 331 n.6 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 621–22).
252 The Supreme Court did not rule on the appropriateness of the $15,000 forfeiture, but
allowed the district court holding to stand. Id. at 337 n.11.
253 In a discussion of Bajakajian and the Eighth Amendment, Cassella notes:
Because it believed that the Eighth Amendment applied only to punitive forfeitures, the Court
concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to all criminal forfeitures and to some, but not
all, civil forfeitures.
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CAFRA formally codified Bajakajian,254 allowing claimants to petition
for a determination of whether the forfeiture is constitutionally excessive.255
Under the statute, the claimant has a burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional.”256 Therefore, the
statute acknowledges the proportionality problem but does little to address it,
leaving the courts no guidance on how to assess the proportionality of a
forfeiture.257
It is important to note that the entire excessive-fines analysis applies
strictly to forfeitures of facilitating property. Cassella has observed that “courts
appear to be unanimous in holding that the forfeiture of the proceeds of the
offense can never be considered disproportional. To the contrary, the courts
view the forfeiture of proceeds as precisely calibrated to the gravity of the
This distinction never made much sense. If the forfeiture of the instrument used to commit a
crime is remedial in a civil case because it achieves some important social purpose, it is equally
remedial in a criminal case. The nature of the relationship between the property and the crime,
and the social and political objectives of the forfeiture, cannot depend on the procedure by which
the forfeiture is accomplished.
CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-2, at 836–37.
254 146 CONG. REC. 5221, 5232 (2000) (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde); see also CAS-
SELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-2, at 839 (“[T]he proper focus of the
Eighth Amendment inquiry in civil forfeiture cases is not whether the Eighth Amendment
applies at all, but whether the forfeiture of a given category of property, such as the proceeds
of the offense or the instruments used to commit it, is ‘grossly disproportional’ to the crime.
That, of course, is the same analysis that the Supreme Court made applicable to criminal
forfeitures in Bajakajian.”).
255 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(1) (2006).
256 Id. § 983(g)(3). What the statute does not address is whether Section 983(g) applies to
remedial civil forfeitures or only to punitive forfeitures. Cassella comments:
Because it believed that the Eight Amendment applied only to punitive forfeitures, the Court
concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to all criminal forfeitures and to some, but not
all, civil forfeitures.
This distinction never made much sense. If the forfeiture of the instrument used to commit a
crime is remedial in a civil case because it achieves some important social purpose, it is equally
remedial in a criminal case. The nature of the relationship between the property and the crime,
and the social and political objectives of the forfeiture, cannot depend on the procedure by which
the forfeiture is accomplished.
CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-2 at 836–37.
257 Complicating matters further, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Austin argues that
proportionality is not a function of comparing the extent of the “fine” to the severity of the
offense, but rather an inquiry as to how closely related the property is to the offense. Austin
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 627–28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority opinion,
however, declined to embrace Justice Scalia’s view, or to endorse a “multifactor test” as had
been suggested by the petitioner, leaving the entire matter in the hands of the lower courts to
sort out. Id. at 622. The majority wrote:
Justice SCALIA suggests that the sole measure of an in rem forfeiture’s excessiveness is the
relationship between the forfeited property and the offense. We do not rule out the possibility
that the connection between the property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today
in no way limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors in determining whether the
forfeiture of Austin’s property was excessive.
Id. at 623 n.15 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, Cassella interprets the case law to suggest
that “the stronger the connection between the property and the offense, the greater the imbal-
ance between the property and the offense can be in economic terms without being consid-
ered unconstitutionally excessive.” CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-
6(a), at 852.
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offense giving rise to the forfeiture.”258 In United States v. Betancourt the Fifth
Circuit held “the Eighth Amendment has no application to forfeiture of prop-
erty acquired with . . . proceeds.”259 As long as the proceeds forfeiture is lim-
ited to the actual benefit, or unjust enrichment, of the owner, this will continue
to be true. With the exception of a few cases in a few courts, where the govern-
ment is seeking proceeds forfeitures far in excess of that particular owner’s
enrichment,260 a proceeds forfeiture should always survive an Eighth Amend-
ment challenge.261
ii. Uniformity—Public Policy Behind Determinate Sentencing
In an era of carefully controlled determinate sentencing, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to justify a rule that imposes additional fines in such an unpre-
dictable and arbitrary way. The assessment and the amount of the fine in an
instrumentality case are in no way tied to the wrongdoer’s degree of culpabil-
ity. The holding in Bajakajian, as codified in CAFRA, gives judges discretion
to impose a forfeiture penalty in an amount up to the value of the property used
in the commission of the crime, as long as the amount is not “excessive”
according to that judge’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.262
Perhaps most surprising and disturbing is the degree to which this devel-
opment disregards principles of determinate sentencing, which Congress has
made a public policy priority and devoted enormous resources to since 1984.
When Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the system of
federal sentencing guidelines,263 it was very much concerned with the lack of
uniformity in sentencing:
Congress’ basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the sentencing sys-
tem in the direction of increased uniformity. That uniformity does not consist simply
of similar sentences for those convicted of violations of the same statute . . . [but]
more importantly, of similar relationships between sentences and real
conduct . . . .264
258 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-3, at 839.
259 United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 2005).
260 See supra notes 214–216 and accompanying text.
261 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-3, at 840.
262 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339 n.14, 342–44. Although the wild-card
element—the forfeiture “fine” that may be imposed in some cases but not others—frustrates
consistent and uniform sentencing, it does not violate the determinate sentencing goal of
reining in judges’ discretion, except under Bajakajian. If the judge were required to award
the forfeiture of the instrumentalities of crime regardless of the amount, the penalties for the
crime would be objectively determinable and not subject to the whims and sympathies of
judges. But Bajakajian upheld a discretionary $15,000 forfeiture, on the basis that the forfei-
ture of the full $350,000 would have been unconstitutional. The Constitution did not dictate
the $15,000 forfeiture award, an amount determined by the unfettered discretion of the court;
it merely barred a $350,000 forfeiture award, which was objectively established as the value
of the property in question. Id. at 337 n.11.
263 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006). “The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 foresees
[sentencing] guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment, i.e.,
deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just punishment, and rehabilitating
the offender.” UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1.1(A)(2) (1987).
264 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f)).
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The federal courts have grappled with these issues in a series of cases, trying
hard to ensure that individually appropriate fact-based sentencing can be car-
ried out consistently with the congressional goal of uniformity in sentencing.265
The sentencing guidelines are intended to ensure that no one is under-
punished and no one is over-punished, and that some measure of consistency
prevails. Facilitating-property forfeitures pose a serious threat to these very
principles. Neither contraband forfeitures nor proceeds forfeitures applied
within the limits of unjust enrichment theory pose this threat, because neither of
those is a punishment per se. But, facilitating-property forfeitures—confiscat-
ing property legally acquired and lawfully held—for the purpose of punishing a
wrongdoer, do pose this threat.
b. Deterrence: The Problem of Arbitrariness
Although deterrence is cited as a reason for forfeitures, the deterrence gen-
erated by the threat of forfeiture is sui generis. It is not like tort law, where the
first policy priority is compensation for victims and the quantum of deterrence
depends on the potential liability for actual harm.266 Nor is the threat of forfei-
ture calibrated to ensure an appropriate or effective level of deterrence, as hap-
pens in criminal law, particularly as required by principles of determinate
sentencing discussed above. Rather, the deterrence associated with the threat of
forfeiture has an arbitrary quality about it.
i. Tort Theories and Deterrence
Deterrence in tort is based on the idea that the risk of tort liability will
encourage an appropriate exercise of care to prevent undesirable outcomes.267
But if that duty of care is breached in some way, the penalty is calculated
largely without reference to the severity of the breach. The extent of tort liabil-
ity is calculated not in terms of how bad the defendant’s conduct was but in
terms of how much harm it proximately caused.268 Thus, a minor lapse of judg-
ment or care can result in a large award of compensatory damages for the harm
actually caused.269
265 See, e.g., id. at 244, 246; Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007); Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 70 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007).
266 J. Clark Kelso, Sixty Years of Torts: Lessons for the Future, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 6
(1993) (“[C]ourts identified two instrumental goals for the law of torts, compensation and
deterrence, but tended to emphasize compensation over deterrence . . . .”).
267 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 25 (5th ed. 1984) (“The ‘pro-
phylactic’ factor of preventing future harm has been quite important in the field of
torts. . . . When the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants realize that they
may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the
harm. . . . [O]ne reason for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that
incentive.”).
268 The exception here is, of course, punitive damages, which exist precisely because com-
pensatory damages may not reflect the egregiousness of the conduct and provide inadequate
deterrence: “One of the major purposes [of punitive damages] is to provide an appropriate
incentive for acceptable behavior in cases where compensatory damages . . . are not likely to
do so.” DOBBS, supra note 231, at 212.
269 See, e.g., Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1172–73 (2011) (The court
upheld a jury award of $475,298 against a defendant who had parked his truck on the dirt
shoulder of the highway in an “Emergency Parking Only” zone. The action was brought by
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In this sense—concerning the disconnect between the egregiousness of the
behavior and the penalty assessed—facilitating-property forfeitures are more
like tort damages than like criminal fines. But even in negligence cases, tort
law provides some element of proportionality. Defendants are held accountable
only for the harm proximately caused by their breach of duty (i.e., for the actual
harm inflicted upon a foreseeable plaintiff).270 Defendants will not be held
responsible for more remote and unforeseeable harms. Moreover, to some
degree, and in certain circumstances, a breach of duty that is likely to result in
great harm is more egregious precisely because it disregards that great harm.
And in those cases where the quantum of harm falls seriously short of the
liability that would generate appropriate deterrence, the system compensates for
the discrepancy with punitive damages.
Forfeitures of facilitating property, however, cannot be justified on the
same terms as tort awards. The amount of the forfeiture typically bears no con-
nection to issues of foreseeability, proximate cause, or the harm caused to vic-
tims. The forfeiture is effected even if there is no harm, and even if there is no
victim.271 None of these concepts behind tort damages contribute to the policy
foundation for facilitating-property forfeitures. Rather, the deterrence rationale
for facilitating-property forfeitures consists only of (1) a general deterrence
embodied in the threat of a genuinely arbitrary penalty, unrelated to the wrong-
fulness of the conduct or the extent of the harm, or (2) the specific deterrence
that once the instrument of the crime is forfeited, it cannot be used to commit
further crimes.272
Note, in contrast, that for proceeds forfeitures, the threat of forfeiture pro-
duces a perfectly appropriate quantum of deterrence.273 The threat of a pro-
ceeds forfeiture promises the would-be criminal no profit from his crime.
Because any and all financial benefit from the crime is forfeitable—no more
and no less—the degree of deterrence is neither random nor arbitrary. Rather, it
is calibrated precisely to deny the wrongdoer any and all benefit from his
crime, and no more.274
the widow of a driver who fell asleep at the wheel and went off the highway into the parked
truck killing himself in the process. The jury found total wrongful death damages approach-
ing $5 million and allocated 90% of the fault to the decedent and 10% of the fault—and
hence 10% of the damages—to the defendant.).
270 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–101 (N.Y. 1928).
271 See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996) (This case, again, presents a compel-
ling example. It may be difficult to identify who is victimized by an illicit rendezvous with a
prostitute. Arguably, the primary victim of this breach of moral decency is the innocent wife.
Far from compensating her for the wrong (as might have been done, if the husband’s half-
share of the car had been forfeited and then awarded to his wife), she was actually penalized
for it.).
272 Such specific deterrence is discussed infra Part IV.B.3.d.
273 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-3, at 839 (“[T]he courts view the
forfeiture of proceeds as precisely calibrated to the gravity of the offense giving rise to the
forfeiture.”); but see the discussion of government overreaching with proceeds forfeitures,
claiming revenues and not just profits and claiming joint and several liability against lowly
co-conspirators, supra notes 217–215 and accompanying text.
274 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-3, at 839.
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Similarly, contraband forfeitures deprive the owner of only what he or she
was never entitled to have in the first place. There can be nothing dispropor-
tionate about that.
ii. Criminal Theories and Deterrence
In criminal law, of course, the severity of the penalty and consequently the
quantum of deterrence are tied directly to the reprehensibility of the criminal
act. The Constitution requires this, rejecting disproportionate penalties as cruel
and unusual275 and rejecting arbitrary penalties as violations of due process.276
The facilitating-property forfeiture flies in the face of these principles. Unless
an owner is entirely innocent, and able to carry the burden of proof under
CAFRA’s “innocent-owner” affirmative defense, he or she is subject to forfei-
ture of the full amount of the owner’s property used as an instrumentality.277
An owner who should have known better or who failed to be sufficiently proac-
tive in discovering or terminating the illegal use of his or her property can face
enormous consequences for that relatively minor lapse.
Thus the “penalty” assessed a less-than-innocent owner has nothing to do
with the degree of mens rea of that owner or the egregiousness of his or her
conduct. The arbitrariness of the punishments is precisely what prompts public
outrage at cases like that of the Lopeses.278 They knew their son was growing
marijuana, so they were not fully “innocent owners.” But the penalty—having
their home taken away from them—bears no proportionate resemblance to the
severity of any lapse on their part. Doling out punishments in such an arbitrary
way violates fundamental principles of both justice and equity.
For proceeds forfeitures, in contrast, no problem of disproportionality
exists when the defendant is forced to disgorge only the benefit he obtained
from the crime. The forfeiture is not punishment per se but denial of the benefit
of the crime. For both proceeds and contraband forfeitures, the amount for-
feited is precisely what the property holder was never legally entitled to have in
the first place.279
c. Incentives for Property Owners to Ensure Against Others’
Misuse of Their Property
For third-party owners, the justification for forfeitures of facilitating prop-
erty has little to do with punishment or deterrence; indeed, the third party who
loses his or her property in such a forfeiture is not necessarily a wrongdoer.
These forfeitures cannot truly be justified as punitive, but are defended as
275 See supra Part IV.B.3.a.i (discussing the Eighth Amendment).
276 See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (stating that a penalty based on
an arbitrary distinction would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but
holding that affixing punishments for drug crimes according to the weight of the drugs
involved, including the weight of blotter paper that is the vehicle for delivering LSD, is not
arbitrary).
277 Of course, the Eighth Amendment will apply to any such forfeiture that is, at least in
part, punitive. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619, 621–22 (1993).
278 See supra Part II.A.4.
279 CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW, supra note 3, § 28-3, at 839 (“[T]he courts view the
forfeiture of proceeds as precisely calibrated to the gravity of the offense giving rise to the
forfeiture.”).
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remedial, justified as a way to provide proper incentives to property owners.280
This policy rationale applies only to forfeitures of third-party owners and only
in civil forfeitures.281
The characterization of these forfeitures as “remedial” rather than “puni-
tive” has some compelling implications. The first is that property could be and,
throughout history, has been forfeited by entirely innocent owners. CAFRA has
changed that, though, by creating an “innocent-owner” defense.282 So if prop-
erty can be forfeited only by owners who fail to qualify as “innocent” under
CAFRA, then forfeitures are reserved only for those who share some level of
guilt. In that sense, even a “remedial” forfeiture may take on some of the attrib-
utes of punishment.283 The second implication is that the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to purely remedial forfeitures since they cannot be characterized
as “fines.”284
The result of this is remarkable and counterintuitive. The amount of the
forfeiture is subject to constitutional scrutiny, and Eighth Amendment limita-
tions, only if the owner is being punished for his or her own wrongdoing. It
may be unconstitutional to punish a wrongdoer too severely with an excessive
forfeiture. But, for those who are not being punished, there is no limit to the
amount of property that can be forfeited. The Constitution, therefore, allows
much harsher measures against those who are not being punished than against
those who are.
The theory of these remedial forfeitures is that threat of a facilitating-prop-
erty forfeiture gives owners incentives to ensure that their property is not mis-
used. This shifts some of the responsibility for policing wrongdoing from law
enforcement to property owners. In Goldsmith-Grant, perhaps the leading case
on the forfeiture liability of third-party owners, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged this remedial purpose of facilitating-property forfeitures:
In breaches of revenue [i.e., bootlegging] provisions, some forms of property are
facilities, and therefore it may be said, that Congress interposes the care and respon-
sibility of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provi-
sions, by ascribing to the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and
guilt in the wrong.285
In other words, the Supreme Court validated a Congressional purpose of enlist-
ing the vigilance of property owners to ensure that their property was not facili-
tating crime. That assistance is secured through threat of forfeiture. In order to
avoid that risk, owners of real property, for example, may need to hire private
280
“[T]he risk of forfeiture encourages owners to exercise care in entrusting their property
to others . . . .” Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 469 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974)).
281 Criminal forfeitures permit the seizing of the property of the defendant, but not of any
third party, whether the third-party owner is innocent or not. See supra Part I.A.
282 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 11 (1999).
283 Id. at 12–13; see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619, 621–22 (1993) (“In
light of the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment, the clear focus of [the
instant forfeiture provisions] on the culpability of the owner, and the evidence that Congress
understood those provisions as serving to deter and to punish, we cannot conclude that for-
feiture under [the provisions] serves solely a remedial purpose.”).
284 Austin, 509 U.S. at 621–22.
285 Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
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security services to police their land and buildings to ensure that criminal activ-
ity is not carried out there.
Although the Supreme Court did not have a problem with foisting law
enforcement responsibilities onto property owners, Congress apparently did.
The CAFRA House Report recounts a circumstance in 1998 when a motel in
Houston was seized by the U.S. Attorney’s Office because the “management
had failed to implement all of the ‘security measures’ dictated by law enforce-
ment officials, such as raising room rates.”286 The House Report quotes at
length, and with approval, a Houston Chronicle editorial:
More than due to shortcomings of the motel owners, this situation appears to be
the result of ineffective police work . . . .
The prosecution’s action in this case is contrary not only to the reasonable exer-
cise of government, but it contradicts government-supported enticements to busi-
nesses that locate in areas where high crime rates have thwarted development. Good
people should not have to fear property seizure because they operate business[es] in
high crime areas. Nor should they forfeit their property because they have failed to
do the work of law enforcement.287
For personal property, the impact of the forfeiture risk is harder to con-
ceive. The threat of forfeiture could, theoretically at least, dissuade someone
from lending his car to an obviously intoxicated person, or from lending his
gun to an enraged person, although in neither of these cases is the threat of
government seizure of the loaned property likely to make a difference. Property
owners already have incentives to decline to lend their property in these cir-
cumstances and to take steps to keep their assets secured so they cannot be
“borrowed” by a wrongdoer. Conscientious property owners do so out of con-
cern for the lives and safety of potential crime victims and out of fear of loss or
destruction of their property.288 Against these incentives, which already exist, it
seems unlikely that the risk of a government forfeiture of such property would
play a serious role in prompting owners to take precautions or to augment the
precautions they are already taking.
d. Removing the Property Used to Facilitate Crime from
Circulation
There is one additional policy basis for facilitating-property forfeitures,
and that is the public interest in removing the instruments of crime from circu-
lation,289 out of the reach of the criminal element who might otherwise use
286 H.R. Rep. No. 106-192, at 10.
287 Id. (quoting U.S. Attorney Here Overstepped Bounds in Motel Seizure, HOUSTON
CHRON., Mar. 12, 1998).
288 For example, one might be reluctant to lend a car to a drunk friend because of fear that
the friend or car might be lost in an accident. These—the threat of grave physical harm or
the destruction of the vehicle—are powerful incentives for the owner to be cautious.
289 See United States v. $145,139, 18 F.3d 73, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1994). In this case, Judge
Kearse, in her dissenting opinion, argued against the reasoning of the lower court, upheld by
the majority in the Second Circuit, that “removal from circulation” was an appropriate policy
justification for instrumentality forfeitures:
The third civil purpose, correction or prevention of an undesirable condition, was essentially
the purpose relied on by the district court, which characterized transported unreported funds as a
crime “instrumentality” that the government could properly, as a civil matter, remove from gen-
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them for future criminal activity.290 This is not so much a deterrence argument
as a purely practical one. After an arrest for running liquor across state lines,
returning the vehicle to the owner merely facilitates future bootlegging activity.
The vehicle is confiscated not as a punishment, or as an example to deter others
from attempting such crimes, but as a remedial effort to suppress the wrongdo-
ing by removing the means of such criminal activity from the wrongdoer’s
control, and perhaps even from the public sphere altogether.291
Although this rationale works well for facilitating property whose primary
uses are related to criminal activity, such as automatic weapons292 or equip-
ment to outfit a meth lab,293 the procedure is more commonly used to seize
property vital to people’s lives and livelihoods, such as homes, cash, and
cars.294 As the Supreme Court observed in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan: “There
is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile.”295
eral circulation. I disagree with this characterization. The traditional approval of the govern-
ment’s removal of “instrumentalities” of crime “spring[s] from the historic fiction . . . that “an
instrument of harm is itself culpable.”
Id. (Kearse, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
290 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984) (interpreting
the congressional purpose for the forfeiture provision to be “removing from circulation fire-
arms that have been used or intended for use outside regulated channels of commerce”).
291 Whether the asset is removed from the public sphere altogether will depend on what law
enforcement does with the seized assets. If such property is sold at a police auction, then the
means of crime are placed right back in circulation.
292 See, e.g., One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364.
293 See Meth Lab Seized in Kincheloe Last Week, SOO EVENING NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012, 12:02
PM), http://www.sooeveningnews.com/article/20121001/NEWS/121009984; see also supra
text accompanying notes 1–6 (discussion of criminal forfeitures).
294 Studies have suggested that the most commonly seized assets are real property and mon-
etary instruments. See, e.g., John L. Worrall, Asset Forfeiture, (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services), Nov. 2008, at 4.
295 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965), quoted in Austin
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993). Dee Edgeworth offers some compelling exam-
ples, presumably from his vast experience in carrying out these forfeitures—offering both a
house example and a car example—when a facilitating-property forfeiture may be justified
on this basis:
[1] What would you do with a house that was modified to cultivate indoor marijuana?
Thousands of plants, and finished marijuana are found within the premises. Every room is filled
with marijuana plants, grow lights, and vents. No one lives at the house. The entire house is an
indoor marijuana grow house. There is a tunnel that leads from under the house where the grow-
ers take the trash and dispose of the refuse in a public area. The windows are covered. The house
was purchased with legitimate funds BUT the absentee owner is knowingly allowing the prem-
ises to be used to cultivate marijuana. The house is not contraband. No proceeds were used to
purchase the property. Neighbors complain that the house is an eyesore and is depreciating prop-
erty values.
[2] Officers make a valid traffic stop on a vehicle and obtain consent to search the vehicle.
They find a concealed compartment that has been specifically built into the vehicle which con-
tains a large quantity of drugs. The registered owner is a “mule” who admits driving drugs from
Mexico to the US and takes currency back to Mexico inside the concealed compartment. The
vehicle makes regular runs between Mexico and the US. CBP documents numerous entries by
this vehicle into the US over the past six months. The vehicle is not contraband. There is no
evidence that the vehicle was purchased with drug proceeds.
E-mail from Dee Edgeworth, Attorney-Advisor, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to David Pimentel (Feb. 22, 2012, 16:12 EST) (on file with
author). These are certainly compelling circumstances when a facilitating-property forfeiture
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Government seizures of cash and real property do not remove them from
circulation in the economy in any case; those assets are merely reallocated
within the economy.296 Moreover, forcing people into desperate circumstances
by depriving them of their homes or of their means of support, such as Mr.
Munnerlyn’s loss of aircraft essential to his air charter business, is hardly a
compelling strategy for combating crime or otherwise promoting societal
welfare.
V. TOWARD A NEW PROCEDURAL APPROACH
Despite the due process concerns cited above, constitutional safeguards
have not, to date, been sufficient to bring rationality to the administration of
forfeitures in our federal system. In Bennis v. Michigan, the Supreme Court
found no constitutional infirmity with seizing the property of a wholly innocent
person.297 Although the Supreme Court found an excessive-fines violation in
Bajakajian, it gave little guidance or structure for addressing such issues in the
future.298
A. What the Courts Can Do: Drawing on Policy for a More Principled
Application of Forfeiture Procedure
1. Tailoring the Application of Forfeiture Procedure to Serve Its
Policy Objectives
In an effort to address these problems, the federal courts can begin by
formally recognizing the unique policy foundation for each type of forfeiture.
For proceeds forfeitures, for example, courts should focus on the principle of
unjust enrichment, depriving the wrongdoer of the profit from his or her crime.
Courts should be skeptical of the government’s attempts to seize assets in
excess of the benefit received by the wrongdoer in such cases for several rea-
sons. First, the legislative history of forfeiture statutes suggests that the purpose
of these provisions was limited to taking the profit out of crime, not to adding
punitive fines to the punishments already prescribed for criminal conduct.299
would serve legitimate public policy in combatting vice. The circumstances that justify the
forfeiture in these cases are not merely that the property facilitated crime, but that they show
a substantial likelihood of facilitating crime in the future. Certainly if facilitating-property
forfeitures are retained in law enforcement’s toolkit, it might be appropriate to limit their
application to cases where the government can show a substantial likelihood that absent
forfeiture the property will be used for criminal activity in the future. That showing would be
easy to make in the factual scenarios posited by Mr. Edgeworth. And more importantly, they
would be justified in terms of a compelling public policy priority, a showing not presently
required for facilitating-property forfeitures.
296 Forfeited real property is resold to others who might use it for illegal purposes, and
forfeited cash is spent. Vehicles, on the other hand, are often kept and used by law enforce-
ment itself. See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual §§ 9-111.600, 9-115.000 (2009); see also U.S. Mar-
shals Service, What is Sold, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://publications.usa.gov/epublications/fed
sales/doj.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2012); see generally Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General,
Attorney General’s Guidelines on Seized and Forfeited Property, CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL (1990).
297 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996).
298 See supra notes 251–253 and accompanying text.
299 H.R. REP. 106-192, at 5 (1999).
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Second, because proceeds forfeitures in excess of actual enrichment are neces-
sarily punitive, they bring with them almost all of the problems generated by
forfeitures of facilitating property: they constitute fines that are arbitrary and
potentially excessive under the Eighth Amendment, and they disrupt principles
of uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.300 Therefore, any deterrent
effect that otherwise might justify such fines is not calibrated to the seriousness
of the crime. Third, law enforcement directly profits from these forfeitures,
presenting a moral hazard301 if not an outright conflict of interest that is not
presented by contraband forfeitures, which cannot enrich law enforcement
authorities.
At the same time, courts need to be sensitive to the lack of a compelling
policy basis for forfeitures of facilitating property. The Supreme Court has
upheld civil in rem forfeitures on the basis that they are deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence, so the concept itself is not unconstitutional.302 But the latitude
the government is given to carry them out can and should be tailored to serve
the legitimate public interest in effecting the forfeiture without intruding unduly
on citizens’ legitimate interests in their own legal, and legally acquired, prop-
erty. The thinness of the public policy justifications for forfeitures of facilitat-
ing property suggests that the benefit of the doubt almost always should be
given to the property owner.303 Because facilitating-property forfeitures may
involve high-value assets, such as real estate and vehicles, there is a moral
hazard problem that should also prompt extra scrutiny from the courts.
2. Establishing Standards for Assessing When Forfeitures Constitute
Excessive Fines
In the application of constitutional safeguards, including the Excessive
Fines Clause, the courts should also consider adopting more concrete guide-
lines or thresholds to give guidance to the government as to what forfeitures
will be considered unconstitutionally excessive. The Supreme Court’s willing-
ness to articulate such guidelines in State Farm v. Campbell, suggesting a ratio
300 Cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 344 (1998) (excessive fines); United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (uniformity in sentencing).
301
“Moral hazard” is a concept in economic theory that has wide application, dealing
mostly with situations when individuals make choices or take risks that are self-serving,
knowing that any harm from such actions will be borne by others. OECD GLOSSARY OF
STATISTICAL TERMS, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1689 (last visited Dec. 21,
2012). Although it is usually associated with risk-based behavior (such as an insured’s fail-
ure to exercise care, knowing that insurance shields him from liability for any resulting
harm), it has application here as well. Overreaching in a forfeiture action will directly benefit
law enforcement at the expense of the property owner, but the government faces very little,
if any, downside if the overreaching is challenged or exposed.
302 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1993).
303 Exceptions may include those situations where the property is particularly suited to
criminal activity, in which case there may be a public interest in removing it from circula-
tion. For example, the forfeiture of lab equipment used to make crystal methamphetamine
might be more easily justified because there is compelling public interest in curtailing pro-
duction of that substance. Forfeitures of cars and real property, on the other hand, are far
more difficult to justify in terms of public policy.
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in punitive damages cases, sets a good precedent.304 This should not be diffi-
cult to do for forfeiture cases, given that any forfeiture is premised upon crimi-
nal conduct. The severity of the criminal penalty prescribed for such conduct is
a sound and reliable starting point for evaluating the “fine” for excessiveness.
The courts might declare that a crime punishable by no more than one year, for
example, cannot justify a forfeiture of more than a certain dollar figure.305 A
mathematical formula or ratio, such as that set forth in Campbell, might be
easily derived to support this.306
An even more compelling application of such an excessive-fines formula
would address the problem of forfeitures by owners who are not the actual
wrongdoers. The Lopeses, for example, were aware that their son was growing
marijuana in the backyard, so they would not be entitled to the innocent-owner
defense provided in CAFRA. But under an excessive-fines formula, which
could be adopted judicially without legislative involvement, the Lopeses’
“fine” would have to be justified with respect to the criminal penalties they, the
parents, could face for their conduct. Such an approach would go a long way
toward addressing the most disproportionate of facilitating-property forfeitures.
B. What Congress Can Do: Procedural Reform
Although a number of the problems with federal forfeiture procedure can
be addressed by the judicial branch, as suggested above, legislative action will
be necessary to address some of the more serious and persistent problems. At
the outset, it would help enormously if Congress enacted a single forfeiture
304 The Supreme Court, although “reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits,” sug-
gested that few punitive damage awards “exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424–25 (2003).
305 The actual numbers to be used in the formula would be up to the courts, but considerable
guidance can be found elsewhere in the law. It is noteworthy, for example, that Title 18
prescribes that fines for Class B and C misdemeanors cannot exceed $5000. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(b)(6) (2006). A felony, no matter how serious, cannot result in a fine against an
individual of more than $250,000. Id. at § 3571(b)(3). These reflect a congressional view as
to what types of penalties may be appropriate for different types of crimes.
306 It might be appropriate to suggest, for example, that a facilitating-property forfeiture is
presumptively excessive under the Eighth Amendment if it exceeds a threshold calculated by
multiplying $1000 times the number of months imprisonment that can be given for the
offense the owner has committed. For example, if a crime is punishable by twenty years, the
presumptive limit for the forfeiture would be $240,000 (240 months x $1000). For a crime
punishable by only six months, the forfeiture of a used car valued at $6000 may be presumed
to fall within permissible constitutional bounds, but a forfeiture in excess of that would be
constitutionally suspect. Although it may seem strange for constitutional thresholds to be
tied to legislatively enacted limits, this is precisely what the Supreme Court did in the con-
text of punitive damages: “Comparing the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct provides [another] . . . indicium
of excessiveness.” BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996). Whether the
forfeiture could be granted in addition to the assessment of a fine under Title 18 is a separate
question. Certainly, whether a fine has been imposed as well should be an important criterion
in the courts’ determination whether a forfeiture based on the same offense is constitution-
ally excessive.
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statute generally applicable to all crimes. The myriad statutes that provide for-
feiture remedies are hopelessly scattered and inconsistent.307
Administrative forfeitures, for example, where due process may be partic-
ularly at risk, are not judicial proceedings in any case, so the propriety of those
forfeitures appears only rarely on the dockets of federal courts.308 The litigants
who voluntarily waive their rights to contest a forfeiture because they fear more
serious consequences in a criminal investigation or prosecution will not be in a
position to appeal the issue, as the waiver would not result in an appealable
order. Adequate safeguards for justice and equity in the law of forfeitures are
therefore unlikely to come from purely judicial sources. The solutions, if they
are to be had, will need to come from statutory sources.
As suggested throughout this Article, a re-examination of first principles
in the law of forfeitures exposes the weakness of the civil–criminal distinction.
Logic and fairness will come only if the procedure is defined in terms of the
type of forfeiture being pursued: (1) contraband, (2) proceeds, or (3) facilitating
property. A procedural approach to each type of forfeiture is proffered below,
prompted by each type’s respective policy concerns. However, given the partic-
ular problems associated with forfeitures of facilitating property, and the weak
policy foundations for those forfeitures, it is doubtful that they can be justified
under any procedural regime.
1. Procedure for Contraband Forfeitures
As discussed above, contraband forfeitures have the most straightforward
and compelling policy justification. Public health and safety require that these
assets be removed from circulation. Moreover, the risk of infringing the legiti-
mate rights of property owners is small because no one can legally assert rights
to contraband in the first place.
Accordingly, summary procedures are entirely appropriate, and the gov-
ernment’s burden of proof can be low. Indeed, probable cause may be enough
in these cases because, where contraband is involved, the presumption should
be in favor of the forfeiture. Notice and hearing requirements can be minimal.
There is unlikely to be a genuine question of fact or law in the typical seizure of
contraband.
The one exception here may be with forfeitures of obscene material. If
contraband forfeitures are too easily done, without a hearing or a judicial deter-
mination that the material is obscene, then First Amendment rights may be
307 See, e.g., Pimentel, supra note 2, at 18–32 (listing in Appendix A over 160 separate
federal statutes that contain forfeiture provisions).
308 There is a provision that allows a claimant to challenge an administrative forfeiture after
the fact based on a failure of notice. 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) (2006). Several of these challenges
have been raised in recent years, but the courts have generally dismissed them, finding that
because the challenges to the administrative forfeitures are untimely or otherwise procedur-
ally deficient, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the forfeiture. See, e.g., In
re Seizure of $143,265.78, 616 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (rejecting a lender’s
§ 983 challenge to an administrative forfeiture of a borrower’s funds it retained a security
interest in; the disputed notice was deemed adequate and the challenge untimely, depriving
the court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the lender’s claims); Mohammad v. United
States, 2006 WL 462478, *1 (7th Cir. 2006).
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jeopardized by the procedure.309 Accordingly, it may be important to adopt a
rule, similar to CAFRA’s rule for real property, that obscenity forfeitures are
always judicial, as opposed to administrative proceedings.
2. Procedure for Proceeds Forfeitures
Proceeds forfeitures are also compelling in terms of public policy. It
would be unconscionable for society to allow criminals to profit from their
crimes even as we attempt to punish them. The risk of infringing the rights of
legitimate property holders is somewhat greater than in contraband forfeitures,
however, because the sometimes difficult factual question must be settled as to
which property was acquired by criminal activity. The downside of getting it
wrong and erroneously applying the forfeiture is greater here as well, so a
higher standard of proof is appropriate. It is appropriate, therefore, for the gov-
ernment to carry the burden by a preponderance of the evidence.
The problems associated with proceeds forfeitures have typically involved
the seizure of cash, either because (1) a person who carries too much of it or
uses it to buy plane tickets is presumed by law enforcement to be a drug
dealer310 or (2) because drug-sniffing dogs alert to the existence of illegal drugs
on the cash.311 Courts have become increasingly hostile to seizures on such
bases in recent years,312 however, and hopefully the courts’ hostility will rein
in law enforcement efforts to seize such assets on such flimsy grounds.
Minimizing the financial incentives for law enforcement to overreach in
proceeds forfeitures, which unlike contraband typically involve cash, or valua-
ble assets traceable to that cash, should also go a long way toward curbing
abuse. Requiring that seized funds go into the general treasury, or to schools,
rather than into the coffers of the law enforcement agencies who are solely and
directly responsible for recovering such cash, may remove this temptation.313
The arguments for this approach have been made effectively by other authors,
and need not be reiterated here.314 It bears repeating, however, that such
reforms appear to be essential to curbing abuse of proceeds forfeitures by law
enforcement. Absent such changes, the temptations and incentives for govern-
ment overreaching may be simply too great to contain.
Notice and hearing requirements should be more stringent for proceeds
forfeitures than for contraband forfeitures. Not only do the seizures of cash
309 See discussion of First Amendment concerns supra note 208.
310 The House Report on CAFRA cited a case in which police had seized $500,000 in cash
from a pizzeria in Chicago:
The court found the need to remind a U.S. Attorney that “the government may not seize money,
even half a million dollars, based on its bare assumption that most people do not have huge sums
of money lying about, and if they do, they must be involved in narcotics trafficking or some
other sinister activity.”
H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 9–10 (1999) (citing United States v. $506,231, 125 F.3d 442, 454
(7th Cir. 1997)).
311 See supra Part III.B.
312 E.g., $506,231, 125 F.3d at 454; Humke, supra note 39, at 1300 n.2 (listing cases that
discount the value of dog alerts on cash).
313 See Chi, supra note 61, at 1668 (suggesting the public schools as an appropriate benefi-
ciary of forfeited property).
314 Id. at 1636; Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 61, at 109.
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need judicial scrutiny, but difficult factual issues—involving the sources of
funds and commingled accounts—are likely to arise and will need to be
resolved.
3. Procedure for Facilitating-Property Forfeitures
Facilitating-property forfeitures are the problem child. As demonstrated
above, the policy justifications for facilitating-property forfeitures are weak,
even dubious. For the wrongdoer, they offer additional punishment and deter-
rence for conduct that is already subject to appropriate criminal sanctions. For
the third-party owner, they provide additional incentives to take care to avoid
misuse of their property, incentives that are arguably both unnecessary and
ineffective. Owners already have incentives to keep their property from being
used in illegal activity,315 and it is unlikely that they are heavily influenced by
the threat of forfeiture, as draconian and disproportionate as that consequence
may be.
At the same time, most of the worst examples of misuse of forfeitures by
overzealous law enforcement, or of injustices resulting from the application of
forfeiture law and procedure, come in the context of facilitating-property for-
feitures. The downside of getting this wrong and erroneously forcing forfeiture
of the property is particularly grave because it involves depriving individuals of
their hard-earned and legally acquired property.316 Moreover, a successful for-
feiture may easily end up over-punishing the wrongdoer, who is already subject
to an appropriate measure of criminal punishment supported by our systems of
determinate sentencing.
With facilitating property, therefore, in contrast to contraband, one should
err on the side of not forfeiting the property. There is relatively little downside
risk if the forfeiture is erroneously quashed: the wrongdoer is subject to appro-
priate criminal sanctions in any case. With this in mind, the government’s bur-
den of proof should be very high. The original language of CAFRA called for
“clear and convincing evidence,”317 but a more appropriate standard would be
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”318 The fact that the proceeding has been a civil
one historically, in rem, cannot change the fact that such forfeitures function in
a punitive way in the fight against criminal conduct. The beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard has been consistently applied in these contexts.
At the same time, and for the same reasons, notice and hearing require-
ments for forfeitures of facilitating-property should be especially demanding. It
315 The property owner already faces criminal liability for conspiracy if the prosecution can
show that the owner knew about the criminal activity and if the jury can infer agreement
from the owner’s failure to stop it. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975)
(“The agreement need not be shown to have been explicit. It can instead be inferred from the
facts and circumstances of the case.”). The owner is also likely to be motivated by the desire
to protect the property from damage, and to protect himself and others from harm due to
criminal use of his property. Any negligence in controlling dangerous property may also
subject the owner to tort liability (for lending a car to an intoxicated person, for example).
316 This contrasts sharply with contraband forfeitures and proceeds forfeitures, where the
property seized is something the property holder never had a legal right to in the first place.
317 Supra text accompanying note 90.
318 The states of Nebraska and Wisconsin employ a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for
forfeitures under state law. Mellor, supra note 85.
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is typically in facilitating-property forfeitures that third-party owners lose their
property, not due to their own wrongdoing but due to another’s use of their
property. Third-party owners are more likely to want to contest the forfeiture
than wrongdoers; third-party owners may have claims of innocence and are less
likely to risk self-incrimination by litigating the issue. Failure of notice or
inability to get a hearing, however, will extinguish those rights without giving
the claims a fair hearing.
Owners of facilitating property have the strongest claim to their property;
as stated above, “[t]here is nothing inherently bad about the property (as there
is in the case of contraband), and there is nothing unseemly about how it was
acquired (as there is in the case of proceeds). This is legitimate property
acquired in a legitimate way.”319 Private-property rights of law-abiding citizens
are held sacred in American society. The Fifth Amendment provides that “No
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”320 With such deeply rooted principles and core American values at stake,
it is not surprising to see public outrage at anything that resembles a cavalier
seizure of such lawfully held private property by government. Accordingly, to
satisfy the requirements of due process and the sensibilities of the American
public, the procedural due process required for a facilitating-property forfeiture
must be substantial and rigorously applied.
4. The Case Against Facilitating-Property Forfeitures Altogether
Given the dubious policies behind forfeitures of facilitating property, and
the due process problems inherent in carrying them out, the more potent ques-
tion is whether facilitating-property forfeitures should be allowed at all. If the
taking of such property is to be justified, or even tolerated, it must be for the
most compelling public policy purposes, none of which can be demonstrated
for facilitating-property forfeitures.
The Supreme Court has upheld forfeitures of facilitating property since the
Palmyra case in 1831 and through the Bennis case in 1996 on the ground that
the practice of in rem civil forfeiture is strongly entrenched in our legal history.
Notably, however, the United Kingdom, which shares our legal history and
tradition, abandoned the concept of facilitating-property forfeitures long ago.321
Absent compelling policy reasons to support the practice, it presumably fell of
its own weight in British courts. Among common law nations, only the United
States continues to pursue this practice with such intensity and zeal. As a result,
only Americans are subjected to the self-serving overreaching of law enforce-
ment, which never has to defend its seizures in the overwhelming majority of
cases322 and which is able to support these activities with the spoils of the
practice.
In light of all of this, Congress should go back to first principles and elimi-
nate facilitating-property forfeitures altogether. The primary public policy justi-
319 See supra Part IV.B.3.
320 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
321 See discussion supra note 47.
322 See supra Part III.C.2. on the problem of uncontested forfeitures.
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fications for this type of forfeiture—duplicative deterrence and punishment for
wrongdoers, and incentives for third parties to undertake precautions and polic-
ing—are the weakest of the policy justifications for the various types of forfeit-
ures, and the countervailing private-property interests are the strongest.
Facilitating-property forfeiture appears to be a concept that has long outlived
whatever remedial purposes it might have had in the past.
CONCLUSION
Concerns about fundamental unfairness in federal forfeitures, as practiced
in the 1980s and 1990s, drove Congress to propose and pass CAFRA, bringing
long-overdue relief from some outrageous abuses of government power—but
the problems with forfeitures persist. It is a procedure vulnerable to abuse, with
an ignominious history of overreaching whenever American society is fighting
something it fears.
Indeed, the War on Terror has brought back some of the most oppressive
aspects of forfeitures, retreating from the modest progress embodied by
CAFRA, and even from the ban on “forfeiture of estate” that dates back to
1790. The financial incentives that forfeitures provide to law enforcement also
encourage overreaching with the procedure. Many property owners are reluc-
tant to contest forfeitures because they perceive the deck to be stacked against
them and because they fear they might incriminate themselves in the process.
That reluctance enables the government to seize large amounts of property
administratively, without having to either defend the seizure in a hearing or
otherwise carry its burden of proof.
Because Congress’s effort to address these problems was a patchwork job,
succumbing to the pressures to achieve political compromise in an election
year, CAFRA fell far short of the comprehensive re-examination of principles
that was called for. As a result, the law still tries to lump all civil forfeitures
together—contraband forfeitures, proceeds forfeitures, and facilitating-property
forfeitures—despite the fact that these three types of forfeitures are categori-
cally different from each other, pursue different policy objectives, and pose
very different risks to justice and equity.
The federal courts can do much to address these problems by recognizing
the policy basis behind the different types of forfeiture and applying existing
procedures with reference to such policies. A principled approach to forfeitures,
narrowly tailoring them to serve legitimate public interests while minimizing
the violence they do to private-property rights, can help keep the process in
check. In addition, the courts can adopt mechanisms for excessive-fines analy-
sis that can similarly guide and rein in government overreaching in this area.
But judicial action will not be enough. Congress, in promulgating a new
and comprehensive forfeiture statute, must also undertake a thorough re-exami-
nation of these doctrines and devise a new approach, with separate procedures,
including distinct burdens of proof, for each type of forfeiture in the new taxon-
omy of forfeitures. And in the case of facilitating-property forfeitures, the
appropriate procedure may well be no procedure at all.
